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District Magistarte can appoint advocate to take possession of property in SERFASAI ACT.

 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

DIVISION BENCH

NKGSB COOPERATIVE BANK LIMITED — Appellant

Vs.

SUBIR CHAKRAVARTY AND OTHERS — Respondent

( Before : A.M. Khanwilkar and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No……………of 2022 (@S.L.P. (Civil) No. 30240 of 2019); Civil Appeal No……………of 2022 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No. 2055 of 2020); Civil Appeal No……………of 2022 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No…………of 2022) (@ Diary No. 17059 of 2020); Civil Appeal No……………of 2022 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No…………of 2022) (@ Diary No. 23733 of 2020) and S.L.P. (Civil) No. 12011 of 2020

Decided on : 25-02-2022

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Section 14(1A) – Taking of Possession of Secured Assets and Documents – Power of District Magistrate (DM) or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) to appoint an advocate and authorise him – Held, An advocate is and must be regarded as an officer of the court and subordinate to the CMM/DM for the purposes of Section 14(1A) of the 2002 Act – It is open to the District Magistrate (DM) or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) to appoint an advocate and authorise him/her to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor within the meaning of Section 14(1A) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002:

– Sub-Section (1A) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act is no impediment for the CMM/DM to engage services of an advocate (an officer of the court) – only for taking possession of secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor in furtherance of the orders passed by the CMM/DM under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act in that regard – It does not follow that the advocate so appointed needs to be on the rolls in the Office of the CMM/DM or in public service – There is intrinsic de jure functional subordinate relationship between the CMM/DM and the advocate being an officer of the court – Apprehension of the borrowers about improper execution of orders of the CMM/DM passed under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act by the Advocate Commissioner, is plainly misplaced. Further, being an officer of the court and appointed by the CMM/DM, the acts done by the Advocate Commissioner would receive immunity under Section 14(3) of the 2002 Act – as an officer authorised by the CMM/DM. There is no reason to assume that the advocate so appointed by the CMM/DM would misuse the task entrusted to him/her and that will not be carried out strictly as per law or it would be a case of abuse of power – Rather, going by the institutional faith or trust reposed on advocates being officers of the court, there must be a presumption that if an advocate is appointed as commissioner for execution of the orders passed by the CMM/DM under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act, that responsibility and duty will be discharged honestly and in accordance with rules of law.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. Viraj Kadam, Advocate, Mr. Soumya Dutta, Advocate, Mr. Devendra Kumar Singh, Advocate, Mr. Karunakar Mahalik, Advocate, Mr. Gouranga Biswal, Advocate, Mr. Manoranjan Mishra, Advocate, Mr. B. Raghunath, Advocate, Mr. Sriram P., Advocate on Record Ms. Kavitha M.C., Advocate Ms. Muskaan Garg, Advocate Ms. Prerna Robin, Advocate Mr. Sreenath S., Advocate Mr. Mukund P. Unni, Advocate, Mr. Sriram P., Advocate, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Advocate, Mr. Manish Shanker Srivastava, Advocate, Ms. Kalpana, Advocate, Ms. Pallavi Baghel, Advocate, Mr. Abhishek Kumar Singh, Advocate, for the Appellant; Mr. M.L. Ganesh, Advocate, Mr. K. V. Vijayakumar, Advocate, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Advocate, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Advocate, Ms. Kanika Sharma, Advocate, Ms. Surabhi Guleria, Advocate, Ms. Oindrila Sen, Advocate, Mr. Rahul Chitnis, Advocate, Mr. Sachin Patil, Advocate,. Mr. Aaditya A. Pande, Advocate, Mr. Geo Joseph, Advocate, Ms. Shwetal Shepal, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Cases Referred

 

  • M/s. J. Marks Exim (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 2246
  • A. St. Arunachalam Pillai vs. M/s. Southern Roadways Ltd. & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 1191
  • Authorised Officer, Indian Bank vs. D. Visalakshi & Anr., (2019) 20 SCC 47
  • B. Veeraswamy & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1959 AP 413
  • Dattatraya Moreshwar vs. The State of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181
  • Dipak Babaria & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 502
  • Doherty v. King, Tex. Civ.App., 183 S.W.2d 1004
  • Donohue v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Norwalk, 155 Conn. 550, 235 A. 2d 643, 646
  • Govt. of A.P. v N. Ramanaiah, (2009) 7 SCC 165,
  • Gurmukh Singh v UOI, New Delhi, MLJ : QD (1961-1965) Vol. 11 C1050 : 65 Punj LR 964 : AIR 1963 P&H 370
  • Krishna Swamy Mudaliar v Palani Pillai, MLJ : QD (1956-1960) Vol. IV C151 : (S) AIR 1957 Mad 599
  • Lalit Mohan Das vs. The Advocate-General, Orissa & Anr., AIR 1957 SC 250
  • Laxminarayana Sarangi v State of Orissa, MLJ : QD (1961-1965) Vol. II C1050 : AIR 1963 Orissa8 : ILR (1962) Cut 492
  • M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. etc. etc., (1973) 1 SCC 216
  • Mahadev Govind Gharge & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka, (2011)6 SCC 321
  • Mahadev Prasad Roy v. S.N. Chatterjee, AIR 1954 Pat 285
  • Muhammed Ashraf & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2009 Kerala 14
  • O.P. Sharma & Ors. vs. High Court of Punjab & Haryana(2011) 6 SCC 86
  • R.G. Jacob v Republic of India, AIR 1963 SC 550
  • Raghunath Sahai v Sarup Singh, MLJ : QD (1961-1965)
  • Rahul Chaudhary vs. Andhra Bank & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 284
  • Ram Narain v Director of Consolidation, AIR 1965 All 172
  • S. Chandramohan & Anr. vs. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai & Ors., 2014-5-L.W. 620: 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 7869
  • S. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar & Anr. vs. P.S. Palani Pillai & Anr., AIR 1957 Mad 599
  • Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 409
  • Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425
  • Satheedevi vs. Prasanna & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 622
  • Shiv Bahadur Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394
  • Slegel v. Slegel, 135 N.J. Eq. 5, 37 A.2d 57
  • The Federal Bank Ltd., Ernakulam vs. A. V. Punnus, AIR 2014 Kerala 7
  • V.S. Sunitha vs. Federal Bank Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 12866

 

JUDGMENT

A.M. Khanwilkar, J. – The seminal question involved in these cases is: whether it is

open to the District Magistrate[1] or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate[2] to appoint an advocate and authorise him/her to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor within the meaning of Section 14(1 A) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002[3]?

[1] for short, “DM”

[2] for short, “CMM”

[3]for short, “2002 Act”

2. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay[4] vide judgment and order dated 6.11.2019 in Writ Petition (L) No. 28480 of 2019 opined that the advocate, not being a subordinate officer to the CMM or DM, such appointment would be illegal. Against this decision, four separate appeals[5]have been filed by the concerned parties. On the other hand, the High Court of Judicature at Madras[6] vide judgment and order dated 18.3.2020 in C.R.P. No. 790 of 2020 has taken a contrary view while following earlier decision of the same High Court on the reasoning that the advocate is regarded as an officer of the court and, thus, subordinate to the CMM or the DM. Having so held, it allowed the civil revision petition filed by the secured creditor (Canara Bank). Against this decision, a special leave petition[7] has been filed by the borrowers.

[4] for short, “Bombay High Court”

[5]Civil Appeal No….. of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No. 30240 of 2019; Civil Appeal No….. of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No. 2055 of 2020; Civil Appeal No…..of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No……of 2022 @ Diary No. 17059 of 2020; and Civil Appeal No…..of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No……of 2022 @ Diary No. 23733 of 2020

[6] for short, “Madras High Court”

[7] SLP (Civil) No. 12011 of 2020

3. The High Courts of Kerala (in Muhammed Ashraf & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2009 Kerala 14The Federal Bank Ltd., Ernakulam vs. A. V. Punnus, AIR 2014 Kerala 7; and V.S. Sunitha vs. Federal Bank Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 12866), Madras (in S. Chandramohan & Anr. vs. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai & Ors., 2014-5-L.W. 620: 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 7869) and Delhi (in Rahul Chaudhary vs. Andhra Bank & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 284), have taken the same view as in the case of Canara Bank impugned in the special leave petition[8] arising from the decision of the Madras High Court.

[8] see Footnote No. 7

4. Additionally relying on the dictum in M/s. J. Marks Exim (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 2246 decided by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, it was urged that the coordinate Bench of the Bombay High Court had answered the issue under consideration in favour of the secured creditors and against the borrowers on the same lines as the view taken by other three High Courts, namely, High Courts of Kerela, Madras and Delhi. However, in the judgment of the Bombay High Court of coordinate Bench impugned before this Court, it has been observed that the dictum in the said decision had not considered the precise question that has been dealt with in the impugned judgment.

5. Briefly stated, in each of the cases under consideration, the CMM/DM appointed an advocate purportedly in exercise of powers under Section 14(1 A) of the 2002 Act. In the cases arising from the judgment of the Bombay High Court, the borrowers had urged before the High Court that the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate[9], 3rd Court, Esplanade, Mumbai on application filed by the secured creditor (Bank) under Section 14 of the 2002 Act passed an order dated 26.7.2019, appointing an advocate to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor. The order passed by the ACMM records that the Bank had advanced a loan in the sum of Rs. 4.44 crore on 31.1.2015 to the borrowers, who had mortgaged Flat No. 262, 26th Floor, Building No. 02 with two basement car spaces in a building known as ‘Kalpataru Pinnacle’ in Goregaon (West), Mumbai. Further, the borrowers had defaulted on 30.10.2017. Their account was declared Non-Performing Asset[10]. As a sequel, on 13.11.2017, a notice under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act was issued to them and posted by Registered Post A.D. The docket was returned with ‘intimation posted’ meaning thereby, the noticees were not available at the given address. The order further records that the Bank served the notice upon the borrowers by publication on 31.12.2017 calling upon them to pay the outstanding dues within sixty days. However, loan amount remained unpaid. As a result, the secured creditor approached the ACMM to pass appropriate directions, on which application the stated order dated 26.7.2019 came to be passed appointing an advocate. The same was communicated to the borrowers by the advocate on 11.10.2019. That order was challenged before the Bombay High Court by the borrowers by way of writ petition[11] under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which has been decided by the High Court vide impugned judgment and order holding that Section 14(1 A) of the 2002 Act does not permit the CMM/DM to authorise an advocate.

[9] for short, “ACMM”

[10] for short, “NPA”

[11] Writ Petition (L) No. 28480 of 2019

The language used in the provision is amply clear. Such delegation could be done only to an officer subordinate and none else. The High Court rejected the argument that the overburdened CMM/DM had inadequate subordinate staff and it would be difficult, if not virtually impossible for the secured creditor to take possession of and realise the outstanding dues by disposing the secured asset. The High Court was not impressed with that argument and preferred to strictly construe the stated provision. The secured creditors have assailed this decision by way of appeals[12] before this Court.

[12] see Footnote No. 5

6. Reverting to the special leave petition[13] arising from the decision of the Madras High Court. The Bank had given loan to the borrowers upon mortgage of their property. Despite the demand to clear the outstanding dues, the loan amount remained unpaid. Resultantly, the Bank classified the account as NPA followed by notice under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act dated 21.7.2017 to the borrowers. Eventually, the Bank took symbolic possession of the property through its authorised officer after issuing possession notice. That was published in two leading newspapers. The borrowers challenged the notice issued to them under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act. That challenge was unsuccessful. Where after, the Bank invoked action under Section 14 of the 2002 Act by filing application before the CMM for taking possession of the secured assets. The borrowers challenged the sale notice by filing application being S.A. No. 59 of 2019. No injunction was granted in favour of the borrowers and to restrain the Bank from proceeding with the sale of the secured property. Hence, the Bank pursued the application under Section 14 of the 2002 Act before the CMM, which came to be disposed of on 6.8.2019 by appointing an Advocate Commissioner to take possession of the secured property. Thereafter, the application filed by the borrowers, being S.A. No. 59 of 2019, came to be dismissed. In the interregnum, the borrowers filed another application in S.A. No.399 of 2019, challenging the order dated 6.8.2019 passed by the CMM, appointing an Advocate Commissioner, in Crl. M.P. No. 2995 of 2019. The Debts Recovery Tribunal II[14], Chennai was pleased to allow S.A.No.399 of 2019, inter alia, holding that the procedure mandated under clauses (i) to (ix) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act had not been complied with by the secured creditor (Bank) and in any case, the appointment of the Advocate Commissioner was illegal. The Tribunal allowed the challenge vide order dated 4.2.2020. That decision came to be assailed by the Bank before the Madras High Court by way of civil revision petition[15] under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court noted two issues arising for its consideration, in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment. The first issue was regarding the correctness of the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal on the plea of non-compliance of clauses (i) to (ix) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act. That came to be set aside being manifestly erroneous (see paragraphs 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment). However, on the second issue about power of the CMM/DM to appoint an Advocate Commissioner, the High Court, amongst other, relied upon its earlier decision as well as of the High Courts of Delhi and Kerala, to conclude that the Tribunal committed manifest error, including not to take notice of the decision of the same High Court referred to in the impugned judgment. In short, the Madras High Court accepted the argument of the secured creditor (Bank) that it was open to the CMM/DM to appoint an Advocate Commissioner for taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto for being forwarded to the secured creditor in terms of Section 14(1 A) of the 2002 Act. This decision has been challenged by the borrowers by way of a special leave petition[16]before this Court.

[13] see Footnote No. 7

[14] for short, “Tribunal”

[15] C.R.P. No. 790 of 2020

[16] see Footnote No. 7

7. We have heard Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned senior counsel, Mr. Viraj Kadam, Mr. Manish Shanker Srivastava, Mr. Devendra Kumar Singh and Mr. M.L. Ganesh, learned counsel appearing for the Banks, Mr. B. Raghunath, learned counsel appearing for the borrowers and Mr. Rahul Chitnis, learned counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra.

8. As aforesaid, the one and only question common to all these cases is: whether the CMM/DM can appoint an advocate in exercise of powers under Section 14(1 A) of the 2002 Act? This issue arises because of the expression used in the said provision, “may authorise any officer subordinate to him”.

9. The earliest decision dealing with the issue under consideration is that of the High Court of Kerala in Muhammed Ashraj[17] wherein the Division Bench of the High Court rejected the argument that mandate of Section 14 obliges the CMM/DM to go personally and take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto. It noted that Section 14(2) of the 2002 Act enabled the CMM/DM to pass order even to take Police assistance and use all necessary powers in taking possession of the secured assets. To buttress this view, reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 409 wherein the Court noted that an express grant of statutory powers carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. In other words, the authority had implied powers to grant relief which is not expressly granted to it by the Act. On that logic, the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala opined that it would be open to the Magistrate who has the power under Section 14 of the 2002 Act to take possession of the secured assets including to take assistance of Police including an Advocate Commissioner so as to facilitate the secured creditor to take over the secured assets. As a result, the Magistrate could also appoint a commissioner for identification of the secured assets and taking possession thereof. This decision has attained finality owing to the dismissal of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1671 of 2009 on 2.2.2009 by this Court. Notably, this decision was rendered before the amendment of Section 14 and in particular insertion of sub-Section (1A)[18].

[17] supra at Footnote No.8

[18] Inserted by Act 1 of 2013, sec. 6(b) (w.e.f. 15.1.2013, vide S.O. 171(E), dated 15.1.2013)

10. The aforementioned decision, however, had been followed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in the case of The Federal Bank Ltd., Ernakulam[19] which had arisen after the amendment of Section 14 of the 2002 Act and insertion of sub-Section (1A) therein. Despite insertion of sub-Section (1A), learned Single Judge following the judgment in Muhammed Ashraf [20], answered the issue in the following words:

“5. …It may however appear at first blush that such an Advocate Commissioner is not an officer subordinate to the District Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate. But a reference to Sections 12 and 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 indicates that the term District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate denotes the court and not the officer in person. An Advocate Commissioner is certainly an officer subordinate to the court and the words employed in Section 14 (1A) of the SARFAESI Act are not to be understood as meaning an officer subordinate in service. Section 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in fact empowers an Advocate Commissioner to record the examination of witnesses whose personal appearance in court is dispensed with. Similar provisions can be found in Order XXVI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 enabling the Advocate Commissioner to record evidence of witnesses and Section 75 (g) thereof to perform any ministerial act even. Taking over possession of the secured asset and handing over the same to the creditor bank is nothing but a ministerial act of the Advocate Commissioner on behalf of the court. The Advocate Commissioner exercising such function under Section 14 (1A) of the SARFAESI Act is only discharging his duty as an officer subordinate to the court presided by the Magistrate. The contention of the borrower that the Advocate Commissioner is not an officer subordinate in service to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and hence incompetent is only to be rejected.” (emphasis supplied)

[19] supra at Footnote No.9

[20] supra at Footnote No.8

11. Once again, another learned Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in V.S. Sunitha [21]reiterated the same view and held that the Magistrate rendering assistance to the secured creditor is competent to appoint a commissioner to take possession of the secured assets.

[21] supra at Footnote No. 10

12. This very issue had also arisen before the Madras High Court in S. Chandramohan[22]. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court after adverting to Section 14(1 A) of the 2002 Act went on to observe as follows:

“8…..

The same is an enabling provision conferring power on the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to authorise any officer subordinate to him to take possession of the assets and documents relating thereto and forward the assets and documents to the secured creditors.

9. The Advocate Commissioners appointed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is in tune with Section 14(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. As per Section 14 of the Act, the secured creditors can approach the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/ District Magistrate to take possession of the assets and documents of the secured creditor. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, instead of personally visiting the spot to take possession of assets and documents, can very well appoint the Advocate Commissioner to visit on his behalf, as in the case of issuing of commissions under the Civil Procedure Code, as it is not possible for the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/ District Magistrate to visit personally to take possession.

10. The amendment inserted by Act 1 of 2013 viz., Section 14(1-A) is permitting the Subordinate Officers to do the above said acts and nowhere prohibits the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate from authorising an Advocate Commissioner to go on his behalf for taking possession of assets and documents and forwarding the same to the secured creditor. The amendment gives discretion to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/ District Magistrate either to authorise or take possession of such assets and document and the word used being ‘may’, it is not always necessary on the part of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to authorise any officer subordinate to him. It is a well settled proposition of law that the observance of the word ‘may’ used in the statute is only directory, in the sense, non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceedings invalid. Sometimes, the word ‘shall’ may also be directory and not mandatory…..”

[22] supra at Footnote No. 11

It then adverted to the decisions of this Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar vs. The State of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181Mahadev Govind Gharge & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka, (2011)6 SCC 321 and Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425 on the principles of interpretation of statute and noted thus:

“11. The object of the amendment introduced in Act 1 of 2013 being to give assistance to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/District Magistrate, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is justified in appointing Advocate Commissioners, instead of authorising Subordinate Officers to take possession. It is well settled in law that Advocates are also Officers of the Court, though not subordinate to Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. As Officers of the Court, the Advocates can perform their duty more effectively than the Officers, subordinate to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in taking possession of assets and documents and in delivering the same to the Secured Creditor. Thus, in any event, the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is devoid of merits.” (emphasis supplied)

13. The issue also received attention of the High Court of Delhi in Rahul Chaudhary[23]. The High Court answered the issue in the following words:

“3.1 To be noted, the receiver has been appointed by the learned CMM vide order dated 05.12.2019.

4. The learned CMM has appointed an advocate to take possession of the secured asset.

5. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that fact that the receiver appointed by the learned CMM has taken possession of the subject secured asset on 16.01.2020.

6. It is, however, the say of the counsel for the petitioner that appointment of an advocate as a receiver was contrary to the provisions of Section 14 (1A) of the SARFAESI Act and, therefore, that part of the order passed by the learned CMM should be set aside as was done by the Bombay High Court in the aforementioned matter.

7. To my mind, the writ petition, in fact, has been rendered infructuous, in a sense, that the receiver would have handed over the possession of the subject asset to the secured creditor, that is, the Andhra Bank.

8. Nevertheless, according to me, the language of Section 14(1 A) of the SARFAESI Act uses the expression “may” and not “shall”.

8.1 There are two ways of appreciating the provision. First, that the expression “may” relates to the choice of the subordinate officer. The other meaning that can be placed on the provision is that District Magistrate/CMM is vested with discretion to appoint officers subordinate to him to take possession of the secured asset.

8.2 The District Magistrate/CMM is obliged to take possession once an application in that behalf is preferred under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act by the secured creditor.

8.3 It is in the exercise of such power that recourse can be taken by the District Magistrate/CMM to the provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 14. This provision was introduced via Act 1 of 2013. Before that the District Magistrate/CMM were perhaps taking recourse to subsection (2) of Section 14 and, thus, appointing advocates as receiver.

8.4 To my mind, after the insertion of sub-section (1A) in Section 14, the only change that has been brought about is that the District Magistrate/CMM has now the discretion to appoint even their subordinate officers as receivers.

8.5 Pertinently, sub-section (1A) of Section 14 does not bar the appointment of advocates as receivers. The same position obtains vis-a-vis Rule 8(3) of The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, which has been cited in the aforementioned judgment of the Bombay High Court.

9. As was noticed in Subir Chakravarty’s case[24], the District Magistrates and the CMMs are overburdened. The position is no different in Delhi.

10. Thus, in my view, since the provision vests discretion in the District Magistrate/CMM and as long the discretion is exercised with due care and caution, the appointment of advocates as receivers cannot be faulted.” (emphasis supplied)

[23]supra at Footnote No. 12

[24] see Footnote No. 17

As noticed from the extracted portion of the judgment, the High Court of Delhi disagreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment which has been assailed in the cases under consideration.

14. Concededly, there is conflict of opinion between the three High Courts[25] on the one side and the Bombay High Court on the other. In the impugned judgment, the Bombay High Court observed as follows:

“9 The language of the legislature is clear. The District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate may authorize any officer subordinate to take possession of such asset and this means that the person authorized to take possession has to be an officer subordinate to the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

10 The decision dated 17th March 2017[26] passed by the Division Bench was not premised on a challenge to the authorization in favour of an Advocate to take possession of a secured asset. The observations at the end of the order are probably the result of the facts noted in the impugned order. The overburdened Metropolitan Magistrates or the District Magistrates having inadequate subordinate staff find it a handicap to deal with large number of applications under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but this would be no ground to violate the language of the statute. The legislature may be requested to intervene. We propose to do that at the end of the present order.

11 …..

12 A perusal of the sub-rule[27] shows that after possession of immovable property is physically taken over by the Officer authorized custody thereof can be handed over for care and protection of the property to any person authorized or appointed by him. Thus, after possession of a secured asset is taken over, its custody can be entrusted to any person who need not be an Officer of the Court or authorized subordinate staff of the Court. This could perhaps solve half the problem faced by District Magistrates and Chief Metropolitan Magistrates.

13 The cry of anguish in paragraph No. 7 of the impugned order is also justified. Each day, at least two, if not three petitions, are filed by way of mercy pleading to this Court that some time be given to the defaulting borrower to clear the defaulting loan so that the property mortgaged can be saved. Wide and varied facts such as exams of the children are ensuing, old and aged parents, paternal or maternal aunt are suffering from an ailment and are under going treatment at a nearby hospital are pleaded. The borrower is making attempts to sell another property to clear the outstanding amounts etc. Equities are pleaded.

14 Courts in India being not only Courts of Justice but Courts of Equity, the orders passed under Section 14 are stayed, but ultimately the petitions fail.

15 Howsoever inconvenient it may be to a Court, rights of parties cannot be curtailed in the manner done in the impugned order. If law permits, the borrower can always tender the outstanding amounts to the Bank or the Financial Institution before a sale of the secured assets take place.

16 The two troubling parts of the impugned order being dealt with by us resulting in the hurdle in the way of the petitioner to seek further reliefs from the Debt Recovery Tribunal having been clear, we dispose of the petition expunging the directions in paragraph No. 7 of the impugned order, as also expunging the authorization in favour of Ms. Priti S. Chavan, Advocate to take possession of the Security as a Court Commissioner requiring the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to appoint an officer subordinate to take possession of the secured asset who, in turn may give custody thereof to any person.

16 We terminate the proceedings in the instant writ petition observing that on the merits of the order passed, the petitioners may approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal.”

[25] High Courts of Kerala, Madras and Delhi

[26]supra at Footnote No. 14

[27] Rule 8(3) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002

The above view taken by the Bombay High Court is one of strict or literal interpretation of the provision as it exists.

15. At the outset, we must notice that the expression “any officer subordinate to him” has been used in several legislations[28] enacted by Parliament/State Legislature. Somewhat similar expression has been used in Articles 53, 154 and 311 of the Constitution of India and in other legislations[29] enacted by Parliament/State Legislature with little variation to further the intent of the concerned enactment.

[28] Section 14 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; Section 5 of the Orphanages and other Charitable Homes (Supervision and Control) Act, 1960; Section 166 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960; Section 10K of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963; Section 43A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 5 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; Sections 55 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 64 and 70 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978; Section 41 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Sections 11 and 16 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992; Section 44 of the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 (also in 1958); Section 22 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000; Section 17 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; Section 30 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Sections 107, 108 and 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 8 of the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018; and Section 31 of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019.

[29] Article 53 (“officers subordinate to him”), Article 154 (“officers subordinate to him” and “any authority subordinate to the Governor”) and Article 311 (“an authority subordinate to that”) of the Constitution of India;

Section 376 (“police officer subordinate to such police officer”) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860;

Section 2 (“members of the subordinate ranks of any police-force”) and Section 7 (“any police-officer of the subordinate ranks”) of the Police Act, 1861;

Section 4A (“any such officer subordinate to him”) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890;

Section 3(5) (“Officer subordinate to the Governor General of India”) of the General Clauses Act, 1897;

Sections 8 and 22 (“officers subordinate to the Jailer”) and Section 48 (“officer subordinate to the Superintendent”) of the Prisons Act, 1894;

Section 195 (“any officer subordinate to the Collector”) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925;

Section 34H (“any subordinate officer of his”), and Sections 110A and HOB (“any person subordinate to him”) of the Insurance Act, 1938;

Section 2 (a) (“any officer subordinate to that officer”) of the Indian Coconut Committee Act, 1944;

Section 14A (“such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government” and “such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government”) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946;

Section 39 (“authority subordinate to the Central Government” and “authority subordinate to the State Government”) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947;

Section 2(g) (“subordinate officer”) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949; Section 47 (“his subordinate in rank”) of the Army Act, 1950;

Section 17 (“by an officer subordinate to that Government” and “by an officer subordinate to the State Government”) and Section 23 (“by an officer or authority subordinate to that Government”) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952; Sections 24A and 24B (“any such officer subordinate to the Central Government or a State Government”) and Section 43 (“such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government” and “such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government”) of the Arms Act, 1959;

Section 56 (“an officer subordinate to the Administrator”) of the Children Act, 1960;

Section 5 (“the officers subordinate to him”), Section 7 (“subordinate to the Administrator and subordinate to the deputy commissioner or the sub-divisional officer”), Section 68 (“subordinate to such officer”), Section 84 (“any revenue officer subordinate to him”), Section 93 (“an officer subordinate to the sub-divisional officer”), Section 95 (“any revenue officer subordinate to him”), Section 96 (“revenue officer subordinate to the deputy commissioner” and “any officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority”) and Section 166 (“any officer or authority subordinate to him”) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960;

Section 5 (“any other officer of customs who is subordinate to him”), Section 28J (“the customs authorities subordinate to him”), Section 129D (“adjudicating authority subordinate to him” and “any officer of Customs subordinate to him”) and Section 129 DA (“adjudicating authority subordinate to him”) of the Customs Act, 1962;

Section 10M (“any officer subordinate to the Director of Inspection and Quality Control”) and Section 13 (“authority subordinate to the Central Government”) of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963;

Section 79 (“any officer subordinate to the Board”) of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966;

Section 42 (“any person subordinate to the State Government”) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967;

Section 21 (“authority subordinate to the Central Government” and “authority subordinate to such Government”) of the Passports Act, 1967;

Section 34 (“any officer subordinate to it”) and Section 154 (“any police officer subordinate to him”) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;

Section 12 (“an officer subordinate to that Government” and “an officer subordinate to a State Government”) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974;

Section 3 (“subordinate ranks of the police force”), Section 12 (“other officers of subordinate rank”), Section 20 (“his subordinates”), Sections 21 and 25 (“any police officer of subordinate rank”), Section 58 (“officers subordinate to him”), Section 70 (“any officer subordinate to the Commissioner of Police”), Section 122 (“police officer of subordinate rank”) and Section 147 (“any police officer of subordinate rank”) of the Delhi Police Act, 1978;

Section 14 (“to which that officer is subordinate”) of the National Security Act, 1980; Section 23 (“an Income-tax Officer subordinate to him”) of the Hotel-Receipts Tax Act, 1980;

Section 17A (“the officer, subordinate to him”) of the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986;

Section 13 (“an officer subordinate to that Government”) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988;

Section 93 (“by an officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government”) of the Railways Act, 1989;

Section 6 (“such other officer subordinate to the Director General”) and Section 15 (“an officer subordinate to the Director General”) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992;

Sections 46 and 328 (“an officer subordinate to him”) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994;

Sections 23 and 24 (“any such subordinate officer to the enforcement officer”) and Section 37 (“any subordinate officer”) of the Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000;

Section 80 (“any officer subordinate to the Board”) of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000;

Section 81 (“any officer subordinate to the Board”) of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000;

Section 26 (“such officer subordinate to the Central Government or the State Government”) of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005;

Section 22 (“the officer, subordinate to him”) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007;

Section 54 (“such officer subordinate to it”) of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009;

Section 43 (“employees who shall be subordinate to him”) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013;

Section 86 (“any officer subordinate to the Board”) of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014;

Section 5 (“any other officer who is subordinate to him”) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017;

Section 45 (“an officer subordinate to that Government or the local authority”) of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017;

Section 100 (“authority subordinate to the Central Government” and “authority subordinate to the State Government”) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

16. The construct of the provision, however, must depend on the context of the legislative intent and the purpose for which such dispensation has been envisaged. The setting in which the expression has been used in the concerned section of the Act would assume significance.

17. This Court has had occasion to deal with identical provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939[30], in the case of-A. St. Arunachalam Pillai vs. M/s. Southern Roadways Ltd. & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 1191 (5-Judge Bench). Even in that case, the Court had to resolve the conflicting views of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court and of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in S. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar & Anr. vs. P.S. Palani Pillai & Anr., AIR 1957 Mad 599 had occasion to consider the question as to whether Regional Transport Officer was subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner. While examining that question, the Full Bench of the Madras High Court dealt with three views pressed into service before it. The first view was founded on “administrative subordination”, the second on “functional subordination” and the third on “statutory subordination”. The Full Bench accepted the third view, namely, “statutory subordination”, being a safer and logical approach. In the context of the provisions of that Act, it was held that the Regional Transport Officer was not subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner.

[30] for short, “1939 Act”

18. Analysing the same provision, being Section 44-A of the 1939 Act, the Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, however, opined to the contrary in B. Veeraswamy & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1959 AP 413. It followed the root of “administrative subordination”. The matter reached this Court where the Constitution Bench by majority upheld the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and, thus, invoked the “administrative subordination” logic. This Court in the context of the statutory provisions and the Government Orders issued by the concerned department concluded that the Regional Transport Officers were subordinate to the Transport Commissioner. It was also observed that in the matter of interpretation, the words of provisions must be looked at; and if they are expansive enough to mean any officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner, that must be given effect to.

19. As aforesaid, while considering the purport of the expression in Section 14(1 A) of the 2002 Act, it must be noticed that the said provision was inserted vide Act 1 of 2013 with effect from 15.1.2013. In absence of express provision, such as sub-Section (1A) under the unamended Act, the CMM/DM could take possession of secured assets on a written application made by the secured creditor under Section 14(1); and while doing so in terms of Section 14(2) of the 2002 Act, it was open to the CMM/DM to take or cause to be taken such steps and use, or cause to be used, such force, as may, in his opinion be necessary. This would include taking assistance of the local Police to obviate any untoward situation or law and order problem at the site while taking over possession. While construing that provision as early as in 2008, the High Court of Kerala in the case of Muhammed Ashraf[31] gave expansive meaning to the rule that it was open to the CMM/DM to take assistance of an advocate to be appointed as a commissioner for taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto for being handed over or forwarded to the secured creditor. It was an inherent or implicit power vested in the stated authority and more particularly because advocates were no less than officers of the court of the CMM/DM. This view has been consistently followed not only by the High Court of Kerala, but also by other High Courts such as High Courts of Madras and Delhi. Most of the CMMs /DMs across the country have been following that dispensation. The only discordant note can be discerned from the decision of the Bombay High Court which is impugned before us. The Bombay High Court has followed the strict and literal interpretation rule and, thus, preferred “statutory subordination” logic. The view so taken can be sustained only if we were to hold that legislative intent in using the expression “any officer subordinate to him” completely rules out the other option which is being followed since commencement of the Act in 2002.

[31] supra at Footnote No.8

20. Indeed, in the case of advocate, the logic of “administrative subordination” or “statutory subordination” cannot be extended. Inasmuch as, for being a case of “statutory subordination”, the provisions of the 2002 Act and the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002[32] made thereunder, must expressly provide for such mechanism. This cannot be said about the provisions of the 2002 Act and the Rules made thereunder. Even the logic of “administrative subordination” as considered by this Court in A. St. Arunachalam Pilled[33] cannot be invoked. For, the advocate by no stretch of imagination can fit into the administrative set up of the Office of the CMM/DM.

[32] for short, “2002 Rules”

[33] supra at Footnote No. 41

21. That leaves us with the third possibility of “functional subordination”. For invoking that logic, we must necessarily conclude that the provisions under consideration are wide enough and expansive to encompass engaging services of Advocate Commissioner. For that purpose, we must first advert to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for which the 2002 Act has been enacted. The same reads thus:

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The financial sector has been one of the key drivers in India’s efforts to achieve success in rapidly developing its economy. While the banking industry in India is progressively complying with the international prudential norms and accounting practices there are certain areas in which the banking and financial sector do not have a level playing field as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world. There is no legal provision for facilitating securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This has resulted in slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimham Committee I and II and Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of examining banking sector reforms have considered the need for changes in the legal system in respect of these areas. These Committees, inter alia, have suggested enactment of a new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the court. Acting on these suggestions, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Ordinance, 2002 was promulgated on the 21st June, 2002 to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The provisions of the Ordinance would enable banks and financial institutions to realise long-term assets, manage problem of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction.” (emphasis supplied)

22. The underlying purpose of the 2002 Act is to empower the financial institutions in India to have similar powers as enjoyed by their counterparts, namely, international banks in other countries. One such feature is to empower the financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them. The same has been translated into provisions falling under Chapter III of the 2002 Act. Section 13 deals with enforcement of security interest. Sub-Section (4) thereof envisages that in the event a default is committed by the borrower in discharging his liability in full within the period specified in sub-Section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the measures provided in sub-Section (4). One of the measures is to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset. That, they could do through their “authorised officer” as defined in Rule 2(a)[34] of the 2002 Rules.

[34] 2. Definitions.-In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) “authorised officer” means an officer not less than a chief manager of a public sector bank or equivalent, as specified by the Board of Directors or Board of Trustees of the secured creditor or any other person or authority exercising powers of superintendence, direction and control of the business or affairs of the secured creditor, as the case may be, to exercise the rights of a secured creditor under the Act;

23. After taking over possession of the secured assets, further steps to lease, assign or sale the same could also be taken by the secured creditor. However, Section 14 of the 2002 Act predicates that if the secured creditor intends to take possession of the secured assets, must approach the CMM/DM by way of an application, in writing, and on receipt of such request, the CMM/DM must move into action in right earnest. After passing an order thereon, he/she (CMM/DM) must proceed to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto for being forwarded to the secured creditor in terms of Section 14(1) read with Section 14(2) of the 2002 Act. As noted earlier, Section 14(2) is an enabling provision and permits the CMM/DM to take such steps and use force, as may, in his opinion, be necessary. This position obtained even before the amendment of 2013 i.e., insertion of sub-Section (1A) and continues to this date.

24. Incidentally, it needs to be noted that along with insertion of sub-Section (1A), a proviso has also been inserted in sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act whereby the secured creditor (Bank/Financial Institution) is now required to comply certain conditions and to disclose that by way of an application accompanied by affidavit duly affirmed by its authorised officer in that regard. Sub-Section (1A) is in the nature of an explanatory provision and it merely restates the implicit power of the CMM/DM in taking services of any officer subordinate to him. The insertion of sub-Section (1A) is not to invest a new power for the first time in the CMM/DM as such.

25. Thus understood, the question is: whether the past practice followed by most of the courts across the country in recognising the power of the CMM/DM to appoint an advocate as a commissioner to assist him in merely taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor, needs to be discontinued as being prohibited owing to insertion of sub-Section (1A)? Section 14 of the 2002 Act, as amended and applicable to the cases on hand, reads thus:

14. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist secured creditor in taking possession of secured asset.-(1) Where the possession of any secured assets is required to be taken by the secured creditor or if any of the secured assets is required to be sold or transferred by the secured creditor under the provisions of this Act, the secured creditor may, for the purpose of taking possession or control of any such secured assets, request, in writing, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction any such secured asset or other documents relating thereto may be situated or found, to take possession thereof, and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case may be, the District Magistrate shall, on such request being made to him-

(a) take possession of such asset and documents relating thereto; and

(b) forward such asset and documents to the secured creditor:

Provided that any application by the secured creditor shall be accompanied by an affidavit duly affirmed by the authorised officer of the secured creditor, declaring that-

(i) the aggregate amount of financial assistance granted and the total claim of the Bank as on the date of filing the application;

(ii) the borrower has created security interest over various properties and that the Bank or Financial Institution is holding a valid and subsisting security interest over such properties and the claim of the Bank or Financial Institution is within the limitation period;

(iii) the borrower has created security interest over various properties giving the details of properties referred to in sub-clause (ii) above;

(iv) the borrower has committed default in repayment of the financial assistance granted aggregating the specified amount;

(v) consequent upon such default in repayment of the financial assistance the account of the borrower has been classified as a non-performing asset;

(vi) affirming that the period of sixty days notice as required by the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 13, demanding payment of the defaulted financial assistance has been served on the borrower;

(vii) the objection or representation in reply to the notice received from the borrower has been considered by the secured creditor and reasons for non-acceptance of such objection or representation had been communicated to the borrower;

(viii) the borrower has not made any repayment of the financial assistance in spite of the above notice and the Authorised Officer is, therefore, entitled to take possession of the secured assets under the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 read with section 14 of the principal Act;

(ix) that the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder had been complied with:

Provided further that on receipt of the affidavit from the Authorised Officer, the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall after satisfying the contents of the affidavit pass suitable orders for the purpose of taking possession of the secured assets within a period of thirty days from the date of application:

Provided also that if no order is passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate within the said period of thirty days for reasons beyond his control, he may, after recording reasons in writing for the same, pass the order within such further period but not exceeding in aggregate sixty days.

Provided also that the requirement of filing affidavit stated in the first proviso shall not apply to proceeding pending before any District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, on the date of commencement of this Act.

(1A) The District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate may authorise any officer subordinate to him,-

(i) to take possession of such assets and documents relating thereto; and

(ii) to forward such assets and documents to the secured creditor.

(2) For the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1), the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate may take or cause to be taken such steps and use, or cause to be used, such force, as may, in his opinion, be necessary.

(3) No act of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate any officer authorised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate done in pursuance of this section shall be called in question in any court or before any authority.” (emphasis supplied)

26. Considering the scheme of the 2002 Act, it is explicit and crystal clear that possession of the secured assets can be taken by the secured creditor before confirmation of sale of the secured assets as well as post-confirmation of sale. For taking possession of the secured assets, that could be done by the “authorised officer” of the Bank as noted in Rule 8 of the 2002 Rules, which reads thus:

“8. Sale of immovable secured assets.-(1) Where the secured asset is an immovable property, the authorised officer shall take or cause to be taken possession, by delivering a possession notice prepared as nearly as possible in Appendix IV to these rules, to the borrower and by affixing the possession notice on the outer door or at such conspicuous place of the property.

(2) The possession notice as referred to in sub-rule (1) shall also be published, as soon as possible but in any case not later than seven days from the date of taking possession, in two leading newspapers, one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in that locality, by the authorised officer.

(2-A) All notices under these rules may also be served upon the borrower through electronic mode of service, in addition to the modes prescribed under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of rule 8.

(3) In the event of possession of immovable property is actually taken by the authorised officer, such property shall be kept in his own custody or in the custody of any person authorised or appointed by him, who shall take as much care of the property in his custody as a owner of ordinary prudence would, under the similar circumstances, take of such property.

(4) The authorised officer shall take steps for preservation and protection of secured assets and insure them, if necessary, till they are sold or otherwise disposed of.

(5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods:-

(a) by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing with similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying the such assets; or

(b) by inviting tenders from the public;

(c) by holding public auction including through e-auction mode; or

(d) by private treaty.

Provided that in case of sale of immovable property in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Transfer of Property Act, 1977 shall apply to the person who acquires such property in the State.

(6) the authorised officer shall serve to the borrower a notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured assets, under sub-rule (5):

Provided that if the sale of such secured asset is being effected by either inviting tenders from the public or by holding public auction, the secured creditor shall cause a public notice in the Form given in Appendix IV-A to be published in two leading newspapers including one in vernacular language having wide circulation in the locality.

(7) every notice of sale shall be affixed on the conspicuous part of the immovable property and the authorised officer shall upload the detailed terms and conditions of the sale, on the web-site of the secured creditor, which shall include;

(a) the description of the immovable property to be sold, including the details of the encumbrances known to the secured creditor;

(b) the secured debt for recovery of which the property is to be sold;

(c) reserve price of the immovable secured assets below which the property may not be sold;

(d) time and place of public auction or the time after which sale by any other mode shall be completed;

(e) deposit of earnest money as may be stipulated by the secured creditor;

(f) any other terms and conditions, which the authorized officer considers it necessary for a purchaser to know the nature and value of the property.

(8) Sale by any methods other than public auction or public tender, shall be on such terms as may be settled between the secured creditor and the proposed purchaser in writing.”

27. However, for taking physical possession of the secured assets in terms of Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act, as aforementioned, the secured creditor is obliged to approach the CMM/DM by way of a written application requesting for taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and for being forwarded to it (secured creditor) for further action.

28. The statutory obligation enjoined upon the CMM/DM is to immediately move into action after receipt of a written application under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act from the secured creditor for that purpose. As soon as such application is received, the CMM/DM is expected to pass an order after verification of compliance of all formalities by the secured creditor referred to in the proviso in Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act and after being satisfied in that regard, to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor at the earliest opportunity. The latter is a ministerial act. It cannot brook delay. Time is of the essence. This is the spirit of the special enactment. However, it is common knowledge that the CMM/DM are provided with limited resources. That inevitably makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the CMM/DM to fulfil his/her obligations with utmost dispatch to uphold the spirit of the special legislation.

29. It is common knowledge that in the respective jurisdictions, there is only one CMM/DM. If he is expected to reach at every location himself for taking possession, in some jurisdictions it would be impracticable, if not impossible, for him to do so owing to large number of applications in the given jurisdiction being a commercial city. Accordingly, strict construct would defeat the legislative intent and purpose for enacting the 2002 Act. Indeed, logistical problems of the Office of the CMM/DM cannot be the basis to overlook the statutory provision. However, we are persuaded to take the view that an advocate is and must be regarded as an officer of the court and subordinate to the CMM/DM for the purposes of Section 14(1A) of the 2002 Act.

30. Furthermore, as was the situation obtaining before insertion of sub-Section (1A) wherein the CMM/DM could avail the services of an advocate or any officer subordinate to him for discharging the ministerial work of taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto, nothing prevents him/her from continuing to follow the same regime even after the insertion of sub-Section (1A). At the same time, while entrusting the act of taking possession of the secured assets consequent to the order passed under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act to any officer subordinate to him, the CMM/DM ought to exercise prudence in appointing such person who will be capable of executing the orders passed by him. Merely because he has power to appoint “any” officer subordinate to him, it would not permit him to appoint a peon or clerk, who is incapable of handling the situation.

31. Be that as it may, the expression “any” in section has not been defined in the 2002 Act or the 2002 Rules. So also, the expressions “officer” and “subordinate” are not defined singularly or collectively. The meaning of expression “any” as given in Black’s Law Dictionary[35] reads thus:

“Any. Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Winton, CCA. Tenn., 131 F.2 d 780, 782. One or some (indefinitely). Slegel v. Slegel, 135 N.J. Eq. 5, 37 A.2d 57, 58. “Any” does not necessarily mean only one person, but may have reference to more than one or to many. Doherty v. King, Tex. Civ.App., 183 S.W.2d 1004, 1007.

Word “any” has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate “all” or “every” as well as “some” or “one” and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute.

Donohue v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Norwalk, 155 Conn. 550, 235 A. 2d 643, 646, 647.

It is often synonymous with “either”, “every” or “all”. Its generality may be restricted by the context;

thus, the giving of a right to do some act “at any time” is commonly construed as meaning within a reasonable time; and the words “any other” following the enumeration of particular classes are to be read as “other such like,” and include only others of like kind or character.” (emphasis supplied)

[35] 6th Edition

32. The expression “officer” as defined in the Black’s Law

Dictionary[36] reads thus:

“officer. (14c) 1. Someone who holds an office of trust, authority, or command. In public affairs, the term refers esp. to a person holding public office under a national, state, or local government, and authorized by that government to exercise some specific function. In corporate law, the term refers esp. to a person elected or appointed by the board of directors to manage the daily operations of a corporation, such as a CEO, president, secretary, or treasurer. Cf. DIRECTOR (2). (emphasis supplied)

[36] 11th Edition

33. The expression “subordinate” as given in P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon[37]reads thus:

“Subordinate” defined. Act 24, 1859, section 1; Mad Act 3, 1909, section 2.

Belonging to an inferior rank, grade, class or order; dependent upon the authority or power of another [Section 121, Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872)]; a person or thing that is ranked lower.

By the use of the word ‘subordinate’ without any qualifying words, the legislature has expressed its legislative intention of making punishable such subordinates also who have no connection with the functions with which the business or transaction is concerned. An Assistant Controller of Imports in the office of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports is a subordinate of the joint Chief Controller through the acceptance of the bribe has nothing to do with the appeal pending before the Joint Chief Controller. R.G. Jacob v Republic of India, AIR 1963 SC 550, 553. [Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), section 165 (omitted by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988)]

The construction placed on the expression ‘subordinate’ occurring in Rule 14(2) of the Rules is in consonance with the meaning and import of the word ‘subordinate’ occurring in Article 311(1) of the Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution which debars the Government from exercising the power of appointing authority to dismiss a Government servant from service. These Rules cannot be read as implying that dismissal must be by the very authority who made the appointment or by his immediate superior. There is a compliance with Article 311(1) if the dismissing authority is not lower in rank or grade than the appointing authority. [Govt. of A.P. v N. Ramanaiah, (2009) 7 SCC 165, 172, paras 23, 24] [Constitution of India, Article 311(1); A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991, rule 14(2)]

The word ‘subordinate’ in section (2)(f) means subordinate in law and not in fact. Although a person looking after the business of another person as manager, may not in fact be subordinate to the other person and may be acting on his own initiative, yet if, as an individual manager, he is in law subordinate to the employer, namely, the other person, he cannot be regarded as the “managing agent” of employer as defined in section 2(l)(f), and no order of compensation can be made against him. Raghunath Sahai v Sarup Singh, MLJ : QD (1961-1965) Vol V C1952-1953 : 1962 All LJ 104 : 1962 All WR (HC) 91 : (1962) 1 LLJ 19 : (1961) 3 Fac LR 445 : (1962-63) 23 FJR 624 : AIR 1962 All 620 [Workmen’s Compensation Act (8 of 1923), section 2(l)(f)]

The word ‘subordinate’ also means judicial or quasi judicial administrative subordination to the Director of consolidation. Ram Narain v Director of Consolidation, AIR 1965 All 172, 173. [U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (5 of 1954), section 48 (as amended in 1963), section 48]

The provisions made in Section 133-A were already there when Section 44-A was added to the Act by the Madras Act (XX of 1948). The latter Act does not contain any separate definition of the word “subordinate”.

Naturally, no definition was necessary in view of the provision already made in Section 133-A. It must be assumed that the Madras Legislature was aware of the existence of Section 133-A when it introduced Section 44-A, and, when it used the word “subordinate” in that section, it must have intended that the word “subordinate” should be understood only in the manner to determine which provision had already been made in Section 133-A of the Act. Krishna Swamy Mudaliar v Palani Pillai, MLJ : QD (1956-1960) Vol. IV C151 : (S) AIR 1957 Mad 599 (FB). [Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), section 133-A]

The word ‘subordinate’ occurring in Article 311(1), has reference to subordination in rank and not subordination in respect of powers and duties. Article 311(1) cannot be read as implying that the removal must be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior. It is enough that the removing authority is of the same rank of grade. Laxminarayana Sarangi v State of Orissa, MLJ : QD (1961-1965) Vol. II C1050 : AIR 1963 Orissa8 : ILR (1962) Cut 492. [Constitution of India, Article

The word ‘subordinate’ in Article 311(1) Constitution of India, means subordination in rank and not subordination of function. Mahadev Prasad Roy v. S.N. Chatterjee, AIR 1954 Pat 285.

The word ‘subordinate’ in Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India means subordinate in rank and not with reference to the functions exercised. Consequently when no officer of equal rank to the appointing officer is available then the order of dismissal or removal will have to be passed by an officer of superior rank. In no circumstances can such an order be passed by an officer of lesser rank. Any rule or statute which permits such an action must be held to be ultra vires as infringing the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Gurmukh Singh v UOI, New Delhi, MLJ : QD (1961-1965) Vol. 11 C1050 : 65 Punj LR 964 : AIR 1963 P&H 370

For the purposes of transfer applications of suits from the Original Side of the High Court the Judge sitting on the original side is subordinate to the appellate side of the High Court. (AIR 1923 Rang. 22)” (emphasis supplied)

[37] Volume 4 (6th Edition)

34. The expression “officer subordinate” as defined in Venkataramaiya’s Law Lexicon & Legal Maxims[38] reads thus:

“”Officer subordinate.”- What is the exact purport of the component words of the expression “any officer subordinate” used in the Sec. 44-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. “Any” is a word which excludes limitation or qualification. It connotes wide generality. Its use points to a distributive construction. The word “any” is used in the sense of “any body”, “any person”. The individual who is invested with the authority and is required to perform the duties incidental to an office is an officer. For determining whether officers are subordinate or not the test is not whether a review of such of their determinations as are quasi-judicial may be had, but whether in the performance of their various duties they are subject to the direction and control of a superior officer, or are independent officers subject only to such directions as the statute gives.- B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1959) Andh. W.R. 308 at p.314: A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 413 (F.B.)” (emphasis supplied)

[38] Vol. Ill (2nd Edition)

35. The expressions “officer, subordinate” and “officers subordinate to him” as given in P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon[39] read thus:

“Officer, subordinate. Officer belonging to an inferior rank, grade, class or order.

Officers subordinate to him. A Minister is an officer subordinate to the Governor. Shiv Bahadur Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394.”

[39]Volume 3 (6th Edition)

36. As regards the procedure for taking possession of the secured assets, it can be discerned from Section 13 read with Section 14 of the 2002 Act. Section 13(4) permits the secured creditor to take recourse to one or more of the specified measures; and to enable the secured creditor to do so even at the stage of pre-confirmation of sale; in terms of Section 14, the CMM/DM has power in that regard albeit after passing order on a written application given by the secured creditor for that purpose. Once the order is passed, the statutory obligation cast upon the CMM/DM stands discharged to that extent. The next follow-up step is of taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto. The same is ministerial step. It could be taken by the CMM/DM himself/herself or through any officer subordinate to him/her, including the Advocate Commissioner who is considered as an officer of his/her court. The Advocate Commissioner is not a new concept. The advocates are appointed as Court Commissioner to perform diverse administrative and ministerial work as per the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure. An advocate is an officer of the court. This has been expounded in Virginia Law Review[40], in the following words:

“The duties of the lawyer to the Court spring directly from the relation that he sustains to the Court as an officer in the administration of justice. The law is not a mere private calling but is a profession which has the distinction of being an integral part of the State’s judicial system. As an officer of the Court the lawyer is, therefore, bound to uphold the dignity and integrity of the Court; to exercise at all times respect for the Court in both words and actions; to present all matters relating to his client’s case openly, being careful to avoid any attempt to exert private influence upon either the judge or the jury; and to be frank and candid in all dealings with the Court, “using no deceit, imposition or evasion,” as by misreciting witnesses or misquoting precedents. “It must always be understood,” says Mr. Christian Doerfler, in an address before the Milwaukee County Bar Association, in December, 1911, “that the profession of law is instituted among men for the purpose of aiding the administration of justice. A proper administration of justice does not mean that a lawyer should succeed in winning a lawsuit. It means that he should properly bring to the attention of the Court everything by way of fact and law that is available and legitimate for the purpose of properly presenting his client’s case. His duty as far as his client is concerned is simply to legitimately present his side of the case. His duty as far as the public is concerned and as far as he is an officer of the Court is to aid and assist in the administration of justice.” (emphasis supplied)

[40] Vol. 11, No. 4 (Feb 1925) pp. 263-77

37. It would be useful to advert to the enunciation in Black’s Law Dictionary[41] in respect of expression “amicus curiae” which reads thus:

“amicus curiae. [Latin “friend of the court”] (17C) Someone who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.- Often shortened to arnicas. – Also termed friend of the. court. PI. amici curiae”

[41]11th Edition

38. Even this Court had occasion to expound about the role of the advocate as being an officer of the court in Lalit Mohan Das vs. The Advocate-General, Orissa & Anr., AIR 1957 SC 250. The Constitution Bench observed thus:

“(11) …..A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. (emphasis supplied)

39. It is well established that an advocate is a guardian of constitutional morality and justice equally with the Judge. He has an important duty as that of a Judge. He bears responsibility towards the society and is expected to act with utmost sincerity and commitment to the cause of justice. He has a duty to the court first. As an officer of the court, he owes allegiance to a higher cause and cannot indulge in consciously misstating the facts or for that matter conceal any material fact within his knowledge. In the case of O.P. Sharma & Ors. vs. High Court of Punjab & Haryana(2011) 6 SCC 86 (para 38), the Court noted that in all professional functions, an advocate should be diligent and his conduct should conform to the requirements of the law by which he plays a vital role in the preservation of society and justice system. As an officer of the court, he is under a higher obligation to uphold the rule of law and justice system.

40. Be it noted that Section 38 of the 2002 Act empowers the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the 2002 Act. Sub-Section (2) thereof does not specifically/expressly refer to power to make rule in respect of matter provided for in Section 14 unlike other provisions noted therein. However, it is open to the Central Government to frame rules in that regard by invoking clause (g) of sub-Section (2) of Section 38. The same reads thus:

“38. Power of Central Government to make rules.-(1)

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(a) to (fc) …..

(g) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed, in respect of which provision is to be, or may be, made by rules.”

41. Pertinently, no such rule has been framed by the Central Government in reference to sub-Section (1A) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act much less to expressly or by necessary implication prohibiting the CMM/DM to engage an Advocate Commissioner for taking possession of the secured assets. In absence thereof, exclusion of engagement of an advocate as commissioner cannot be countenanced.

42. Whereas, applying the “functional subordination” test, we are persuaded to take the view that sub-Section (1A) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act is no impediment for the CMM/DM to engage services of an advocate (an officer of the court) – only for taking possession of secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor in furtherance of the orders passed by the CMM/DM under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act in that regard. It does not follow that the advocate so appointed needs to be on the rolls in the Office of the CMM/DM or in public service. There is intrinsic de jure functional subordinate relationship between the CMM/DM and the advocate being an officer of the court. The apprehension of the borrowers about improper execution of orders of the CMM/DM passed under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act by the Advocate Commissioner, is plainly misplaced. Further, being an officer of the court and appointed by the CMM/DM, the acts done by the Advocate Commissioner would receive immunity under Section 14(3) of the 2002 Act – as an officer authorised by the CMM/DM. There is no reason to assume that the advocate so appointed by the CMM/DM would misuse the task entrusted to him/her and that will not be carried out strictly as per law or it would be a case of abuse of power. Rather, going by the institutional faith or trust reposed on advocates being officers of the court, there must be a presumption that if an advocate is appointed as commissioner for execution of the orders passed by the CMM/DM under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act, that responsibility and duty will be discharged honestly and in accordance with rules of law.

43. For the view taken by us hitherto, the exposition in Satheedevi vs. Prasanna & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 622M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. etc. etc., (1973) 1 SCC 216, and Dipak Babaria & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 502, will be of no avail to the borrowers. In that, we have not invoked the principle of casus omissus. In our view, in law, an advocate is an officer of the court and, thus, subordinate to the CMM/DM. Further, there is no indication in the 2002 Act or the Rules made thereunder to exclude such interpretation. For the same reason, the plea regarding applying principle of ejusdem generis or noscitur a sodis and for that matter, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, also need not detain us.

44. The secured creditors would rely on the dictum of this Court in Authorised Officer, Indian Bank vs. D. Visalakshi & Anr., (2019) 20 SCC 47 wherein this Court upon considering the nature of activities of the Chief Judicial Magistrate[42] on the one hand and that of the CMM/DM on the other, held that the CJM is competent to process the request of the secured creditor to take possession of the secured assets under Section 14 of the 2002 Act. However, it is unnecessary to dilate on that decision considering the view taken hitherto that the advocate must be regarded as an officer of the court and, in law, subordinate to the concerned CMM/DM within their jurisdiction. This interpretation in applying “functional subordination” test, would further the legislative intent and the purpose for enacting the 2002 Act. We hold that it would be open to the CMM/DM to appoint an advocate commissioner to assist him/her in execution of the order passed under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act.

[42] for short, “CJM”

45. A fortiori, the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court impugned in the present appeals[43] is declared as not a good law.

[43]see Footnote No. 5

Whereas, we uphold the conclusion of the three High Courts, namely, High Courts of Kerala, Madras and Delhi on the question under consideration.

46. Although, we have agreed with the view taken by the Madras High Court about the power of the CMM/DM to appoint an Advocate Commissioner, yet S.L.P (Civil) No. 12011 of 2020 filed by the borrowers needs to be delinked and heard for admission separately, limited to the first issue about compliance or non-compliance of clauses (i) to (ix) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act. That issue has been answered by the High Court in favour of the secured creditor and against the borrowers, in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment. The correctness whereof will have to be considered on its own merits.

47. In view of the above:

(i) the appeals[44] filed by the secured creditors are allowed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Bombay High Court is set aside and the subject writ petition[45] stands dismissed.

(ii) The special leave petition[46] filed by the borrowers against the impugned judgment and order of the Madras High Court is delinked for being heard for admission on 4.3.2022, on the limited issue (first issue) regarding compliance or non-compliance of clauses (i) to (ix) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act in the fact situation of the present case,

(iii) No order as to costs.

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

[44] Civil Appeal No…..of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No. 30240 of 2019; Civil Appeal No…..of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No. 2055 of 2020; Civil Appeal No…..of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No……of 2022 @ Diary No. 17059 of 2020; and Civil Appeal No…..of 2022 @ SLP (Civil) No……of 2022 @ Diary No. 23733 of 2020 [Footnote No. 5]

[45] Writ Petition (L) No. 28480 of 2019 [Footnote No. 17]

[46] SLP (Civil) No. 12011 of 2020 [Footnote No. 7]

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Locker Facility – Hiring of – Banks cannot wash off their hands and claim that they bear no liability towards their customers for the operation of the locker.

Law

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIVISION BENCH
AMITABHA DASGUPTA — Appellant
Vs.
UNITED BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Respondent
( Before : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Vineet Saran, JJ. )
Civil Appeal No. 3966 of 2010
Decided on : 19-02-2021
A. Banking Law – Lockers – Locker Facility – Hiring of – Banks cannot wash off their
hands and claim that they bear no liability towards their customers for the operation of
the locker – Very purpose for which the customer avails of the locker hiring facility is so
that they may rest assured that their assets are being properly taken care of – Such
actions of the banks would not only violate the relevant provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act, but also damage investor confidence and harm our reputation as an
emerging economy – Thus it is necessary that the RBI lays down comprehensive
directions mandating the steps to be taken by banks with respect to locker facility/safe
deposit facility management.
B. Banking Law – Banks as service providers under the earlier Consumer Protection
Act, 1986, as well as the newly enacted Consumer Protection Act, 2019, owe a separate
duty of care to exercise due diligence in maintaining and operating their locker or safety
deposit systems – This Court emphasize that irrespective of the value of the articles
placed inside the locker, the bank is under a separate obligation to ensure that proper
procedures are followed while allotting and operating the lockers:
(a) This includes maintenance of a locker register and locker key register.
(b) The locker register shall be consistently updated in case of any change in
allotment.
(c) The bank shall notify the original locker holder prior to any changes in the
allotment of the locker, and give them reasonable opportunity to withdraw the articles
deposited by them if they so wish.
(c) The bank shall notify the original locker holder prior to any changes in the
allotment of the locker, and give them reasonable opportunity to withdraw the articles
deposited by them if they so wish.
(d) Banks may consider utilizing appropriate technologies, such as block chain
technology which is meant for creating digital ledger for this purpose.
(e) The custodian of the bank shall additionally maintain a record of access to the
lockers, containing details of all the parties who have accessed the lockers and the date
and time on which they were opened and closed.

(f) The bank employees are also obligated to check whether the lockers are properly
closed on a regular basis. If the same is not done, the locker must be immediately closed
and the locker holder shall be promptly intimated so that they may verify any resulting
discrepancy in the contents of the locker.
(g) The concerned staff shall also check that the keys to the locker are in proper
condition.
(h) In case the lockers are being operated through an electronic system, the bank shall
take reasonable steps to ensure that the system is protected against hacking or any
breach of security.
(i) The customers’ personal data, including their biometric data, cannot be shared
with third parties without their consent. The relevant rules under the Information
Technology Act, 2000 will be applicable in this regard.
(j) The bank has the power to break open the locker only in accordance with the
relevant laws and RBI regulations, if any. Breaking open of the locker in a manner
other than that prescribed under law is an illegal act which amounts to gross deficiency
of service on the part of the bank as a service provider.
(k) Due notice in writing shall be given to the locker holder at a reasonable time prior
to the breaking open of the locker. Moreover, the locker shall be broken open only in the
presence of authorized officials and an independent witness after giving due notice to
the locker holder. The bank must prepare a detailed inventory of any articles found
inside the locker, after the locker is opened, and make a separate entry in the locker
register, before returning them to the locker holder. The locker holder’s signature
should be obtained upon the receipt of such inventory so as to avoid any dispute in the
future.
(l) The bank must undertake proper verification procedures to ensure that no
unauthorized party gains access to the locker. In case the locker remains inoperative for
a long period of time, and the locker holder cannot be located, the banks shall transfer
the contents of the locker to their nominees/legal heirs or dispose of the articles in a
transparent manner, in accordance with the directions issued by the RBI in this regard.
(m) The banks shall also take necessary steps to ensure that the space in which the
locker facility is located is adequately guarded at all times.
(n) A copy of the locker hiring agreement, containing the relevant terms and
conditions, shall be given to the customer at the time of allotment of the locker so that
they are intimated of their rights and responsibilities.
(o) The bank cannot contract out of the minimum standard of care with respect to
maintaining the safety of the lockers as outlined supra.
Counsel for Appearing Parties
Ms. Pallak Bhagar, Advocate, Mr. Parijat Sinha, Advocate, for the Appellant; Mr. Rajesh Kumar-I,
Advocate, Mr. Anant Gautam, Advocate, Mr. Nipun Sharma, Advocate, For M/S. Mitter & Mitter Co.,
Advocate, for the Respondent.
Cases Referred

Atul Mehra v. Bank of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 P&H 11
Blair v. Riley, 175 N.E.R 210
Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 668
Cussen vs. Southern Cal. Savings Bank, 65 P. 1099 (1901)
Emma M. Lockwood v. The Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Company, 50 N.Y.S 974 (N.Y.
1898)
Jagdish Chandra Trikha vs. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1998 Delhi 266.
Kush Kalra v. Reserve Bank of India, 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 41
Mahender Singh Siwach v. Punjab and Sind Bank, (2006) 4 CPJ 231 (NC)
Mamta Chaudaha v. Branch Manager/Head Manager, State Bank of India, (2020) 1 CPJ 276
(NC)
Mayer vs. Brensigner, 54 N.E 159 (1899)
Mohinder Singh Nanda v. Bank of Maharashtra, 1998 ISJ (Banking) 673
National Bank of Lahore Ltd. vs. Sohan Lal Saigal, AIR 1962 PH 534
National Commission in UCO Bank v. RG Srivastava, 1996 (1) CPR 97
National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead., 95 N.E. 973 (1911)
National Safe Deposit Company v. Stead, Attorney General, 1495 N.E.R. 973
Pune Zilla Madyawarti Sahakari Bank Limited v. Ashok Bayaji Ghogare, 2015 SCC OnLine
NCDRC 2832
Punjab National Bank, Bombay v. K.B. Shetty, 1991 (1) C.P.C. 592
Roberts v. Stuyvesant Safe Deposit Co., (1890) 123 N.Y 57
JUDGMENT
Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J. – This appeal, by special leave, arises out of the judgment of the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (‘National Commission’) delivered on
18.12.2008 dismissing the Revision Petition filed against the judgment of the State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission (‘State Commission’) dated 12.10.2004.
2. The following are the facts out of which this appeal arises:
2.1 In the early 1950’s, the Appellant’s mother (since deceased) took a locker on rent bearing
No. A-222 in the Deshapriya Park, Kolkata Branch of the Respondent No. 1 Bank. In 1970, the
Appellant/Complainant was included as a joint holder of the locker. On 27.05.1995, the
Appellant visited the Respondent No.1 Bank to operate the locker and deposit the locker rent.
However, the Appellant was informed that the Bank had broken open his locker on 22.09.1994
for non-payment of rent dues for the period of 1993-1994. Further, that the locker had
subsequently been reallocated to another customer.
2.2 On 29.05.1995 and 2.06.1995, the Appellant sent communications to Respondent No. 1
claiming that such breaking of his locker by the Bank was illegal since he had cleared dues for
1994-1995 on 30.07.1994, i.e., prior to the breaking of the locker. The Chief Manager of
Respondent 1, who is Respondent No. 3 in the present appeal, responded to the communication
and admitted to having inadvertently broken open the locker, though there were no outstanding
dues to be paid, and apologized for the same. He stated as an ancillary point that reminders for
the payment of dues had been sent on 25.11.1993 and 23.02.1994. However, that these would
have no meaning since the dues were subsequently paid by the Appellant on 30.06.1994.
2.3 On 17.06.1995, when the Appellant went to collect the contents of the locker, it is alleged
that he found only two (one pair of bangles and one pair of ear pussa) of the seven ornaments
that had been deposited in the locker in a non-sealed envelope. However, Respondent No. 1
Bank contends that only those two ornaments were found in the Appellant’s locker when it was
broken open. That the same is evident from the inventory prepared by Respondent No. 1 when
the locker was broken open in the presence of an independent witness.

2.4 Subsequently, the Appellant filed a consumer complaint before the District Consumer
Forum (‘District Forum’) calling upon Respondent No. 1 to return the seven ornaments that were
in the locker; or alternatively pay Rs. 3,00,000/- towards the cost of jewelry, and compensation
for damages suffered by the Appellant.
2.5 The District Forum allowed the complaint and held Respondent No. 1 liable for deficiency
of service, relying upon Respondent No. 3’s admission that the Bank had inadvertently broken
open the Appellant’s locker though there were no pending rent dues. Further, on the claim for
the cost of seven ornaments, it was held that Respondent No. 1 could not prove that there had
been only two ornaments in the locker since there were no independent witnesses in the
presence of whom the locker was opened. Hence, Respondent No. 1 was directed to return the
entire contents of the locker, or alternatively pay the Appellant Rs. 3,00,000/- towards cost of
the jewelry and, Rs. 50,000/- as compensation for mental agony, harassment, and cost of
litigation.
2.6 On appeal, the State Commission vide order dated 12.10.2004 accepted the District
Commission’s findings on the question of deficiency of service, though it reduced the
compensation from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 30,000/-. However, with respect to recovery of the cost
of the ornaments, the State Commission, relying upon the judgment of the National
Commission in UCO Bank v. RG Srivastava, 1996 (1) CPR 97 observed that the dispute on
the contents of the locker can only be decided upon provision of elaborate evidence. That the
Consumer Forum was not equipped to undertake this evaluation since it only has jurisdiction to
conduct a summary trial. Therefore, the Appellants were directed to approach the civil court for
adjudication on the contents of the locker.
2.7 The Revision Petition against the order of the State Commission was dismissed vide the
impugned order. The National Commission by the impugned judgment, accepted the State
Commission’s holding on the limited jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum to adjudicate on the
recovery of the contents of the locker.
Hence, the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that even if the case is remitted to the civil court for
adjudication on the issue of the contents of the locker, it would be highly improbable to ascertain the
same since the contents of a locker are exclusively known only to the locker holder. On the question
of damages, he relied on Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 668 to
argue that compensation must be awarded to bring a qualitative change in the attitude of the service
provider.
3.1 Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the National Commission’s
holding does not warrant interference. He submitted that compensation for the loss of jewellery can
only be awarded after appreciation of evidence by the trial court.
4. Heard Learned Counsel for both parties. Based on a perusal of the record, the following issues
arise for consideration in the present appeal:
4.1 First, Whether the Bank owes a duty of care to the locker holder under the laws of bailment
or any other law with respect to the contents of the locker? Whether the same can be effectively
adjudicated in the course of consumer dispute proceedings?
4.2 Second, irrespective of the answer to the previous issue, whether the Bank owes an
independent duty of care to its customers with respect to diligent management and operation of
the locker, separate from its contents? Whether compensation can be awarded for noncompliance with such duty?

I. Relief with Respect to the Contents of the Locker
5. Disputes between banks and locker holders, pertaining to loss of articles placed inside the locker,
have been subject to judicial consideration in various jurisdictions for nearly acentury. For a broader
understanding of the subject, we find it necessary to briefly refer to certain judgments of foreign
jurisdictions, before clarifying the position under Indian law.
5.1 The dominant view of courts around the globe has been that the bank is in the position of a bailee
with respect to the goods placed inside the locker by the locker holder. In Roberts v. Stuyvesant
Safe Deposit Co., (1890) 123 N.Y 57 the defendant company permitted the police under a search
warrant, to confiscate the articles that were inside the plaintiffs locker. However, the articles were
subsequently stolen from police custody. A suit was filed by the plaintiff, alleging that the defendant
company failed to comply with the duty of care required under the law by permitting the police to
take away articles that were not mentioned in the search warrant. Affirming the plaintiffs contentions,
the Court of Appeals of New York made the following observations about the relationship of
bailment between the parties:
“The legal relationship which the defendant held to the plaintiff, and out of which this
controversy has arisen, was that of a bailee or depositary for hire. The fundamental question in
the case is whether the defendant, upon the undisputed evidence in the record, discharged those
duties and obligations to the plaintiff which the law imposed upon it in regard to the care and
custody of her property.” (emphasis supplied)
It is pertinent to note the Court’s observation that whether or not the defendant had discharged its
obligations as a bailee would have to be discerned from the undisputed evidence on the record.
5.2 The position of law stated in Stuvyesant Safe Deposit Co. (supra) has been reiterated in
subsequent precedents which have governed the law on the field such as Emma M. Lockwood v.
The Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Company, 50 N.Y.S 974 (N.Y. 1898), Mayer vs.
Brensigner, 54 N.E 159 (1899), National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead., 95 N.E. 973 (1911) In Cussen
vs. Southern Cal. Savings Bank, 65 P. 1099 (1901) money kept by the plaintiff in the bank’s safe
deposit vault was lost. The Supreme Court of California held that the bank was liable under the laws
of bailment. However, it observed that the plaintiff would have to make a prima facie case that they
had deposited the money inside the locker, and that it was subsequently lost. The burden of proof
would then shift to the defendant bank to prove that it exercised the necessary care required under the
laws of bailment for the protection of its contents. Therefore, before applying the laws of bailment,
the court must first find on the facts of the case whether the plaintiff had transferred possession of the
articles to the bank.
6. To identify if the relationship of bailment exists between the bank and the locker holder under
Indian law, it is necessary at the outset to refer to the relevant provisions under the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 (‘Contract Act’):
148. Bailment’, bailor’ and bailee’ defined.-A ‘bailment’ is the delivery of goods by one
person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall, when the purpose is
accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person
delivering them. The person delivering the goods is called the ‘bailor’. The person to whom they
are delivered is called the ‘bailee’.
149. Delivery to bailee how made.-The delivery to the bailee may be made by doing anything
which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the intended bailee or of any
person authorised to hold them on his behalf.”
Thus, from the aforementioned provisions, it can be inferred that three components need to be
fulfilled for the existence of bailment. These are: (i) delivery of goods from one person to another by
transfer of possession, actual or constructive; (ii) an express or implied contract for delivery; (iii)
delivery should be for accomplishment of a purpose.
7. Unfortunately, there is no substantive domestic legislation or sector-specific regulations which
may throw light upon the issue of whether banks are responsible under the laws of bailment for the
loss of articles placed inside the locker. On 4.12.2006, the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) had issued a
Draft Circular on Safe-Deposit Lockers (‘2006 Circular’).[8] This circular was only in the form of a
proposal issued to the banks and hence does not have any binding value. However, it is useful in
understanding the RBIs position at that stage. Clause 2.1 of the 2006 Circular states:
“2. Security aspects relating to Safe Deposit Lockers: 2.1 It is clarified that the relationship
between the bank and the locker hirer is in the nature of a ‘bailor and bailee’ and not ‘landlord
and tenant’ though the bank has no knowledge of the contents of the locker and the bank is
required to exercise due care and necessary precaution for the protection of the lockers provided
to the customer.” (emphasis supplied)
[8] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_CircularI
On perusal of the 2006 Circular, it is evident that at that point in time, the RBI had recommended that
the laws of bailment ought to guide the relationship between the bank and the locker holder, even if
the bank has no knowledge of the contents of the locker.
7.1 The RBI had also issued guidelines covering inter alia, the subject of safe custody of articles
placed inside the lockers (Circular No. RBI/2006-2007/325) on 17.04.2007 (‘2007 Circular).[9]
There was no clause on the nature of the legal relationship between the bank and the locker holder in
the 2007 Circular. The only reference to the Contract Act was as follows:
“3.5 Banks are advised to be guided also by the provisions of Sections 45 ZC to 45 ZF of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the Banking Companies (Nomination) Rules, 1985 and the
relevant provisions of Indian Contract Act and Indian Succession Act.” (emphasis supplied)
[9] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx?Id=3422.
However, this observation was made in the specific context of return of safe custody of articles to the
survivors/legal heirs of deceased locker holders and hence may not have much bearing in the present
case.
7.2 Subsequently, in response to a Right to Information (‘RTI) enquiry made in 2017, the RBI, and
various public sector banks, stated that as per the agreement entered into with the customers who are
hiring/leasing the lockers, the banks have no liability for loss or damage of articles placed inside the
bank lockers. Hence the position of the RBI from 2006 to 2017 has undergone a sea-change. The
position adopted by the banks was challenged before the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI) as
being in the nature of an anti-competitive practice. The CCI dismissed the claim, while making the
following observations:[10]
“7. In the instant case, there is no such material to suggest any understanding / consensus /
arrangement amongst the Opposite Parties to have pursued any of the aforesaid prohibited
activities. Suspicion of a cartel has been raised in the information as all the Opposite Parties
allegedly do not take responsibility for any loss of valuables kept by customers availing safety
deposit locker facility from them. However, the RTI replies of some of the Opposite Parties
suggest that they are not completely absolved for loss of valuables kept in their locker. For
instance, the reply dated 7th October, 2015 of Bank of Baroda inter alia states that in case of
loss suffered by the lessee due to theft or burglary etc. of safe custody locker, the liability of the
bank will depend upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the burglary. Further, the reply
dated 13th October, 2015 of Dena Bank states that the responsibility of the bank shall be
governed by the terms and conditions laid down in the memorandum of hiring of locker and the
guidelines issued by RBI from time to time. Reply dated 19th October, 2015 of Andhra Bank
states that the relationship between the bank and its customer, in case of safe deposit locker, is
that of ‘lessor and lessee’ and the particulars of the articles kept in safe deposit locker will not be
disclosed by the customer to the bank and hence, the bank cannot take responsibility for
compensating any loss as the extent of such loss cannot be assessed. It has been further stated
that the bank, however, takes all necessary measures and precautions to safeguard the lockers
provided to the customers. Similarly, the reply dated 30th October, 2015 of Corporation Bank
states that its liability in case of theft/loss of valuables kept in its safety lockers depends upon
the parameters on which the bank takes insurance on the lockers and the same parameters will
be adopted while settlement of claims in case of theft. Taking into consideration all these replies
and in the absence of any material suggesting collusion amongst the Opposite Parties, it cannot
be said that a uniform practice is followed by all the Opposite Parties to avoid
responsibility/liability for loss of valuables kept by customers availing their safety deposit
locker facility.” (emphasis supplied)
[10] Kush Kalra v. Reserve Bank of India, 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 41
Therefore, the CCI took notice of the fact that it is common industry practice for banks to disclaim
liability for loss of articles placed inside the locker, though there are no uniform parameters or
policies guiding the same. Additionally, the banks have stated that acceptance of responsibility for
loss of articles placed in their locker facility will depend upon the relevant facts and circumstances of
each case, such as the terms of the locker hiring agreement, the circumstances under which the
articles were lost or stolen, and so on.
8. There has also not been any authoritative pronouncement from this Court on the issue of whether
banks are responsible as bailees, or in any other capacity, for any loss or damage to the contents of
the lockers. However, there have been various High Court judgments guiding the field. One of the
notable cases in which this issue arose was Jagdish Chandra Trikha vs. Punjab National Bank,
AIR 1998 Delhi 266. In this case, the appellants had, before the partition of India, entrusted a sealed
box of gold ornaments to the respondent bank in Peshawar on the payment of a fee for safekeeping.
The box was moved to the Rawalpindi branch, then subsequently to the Lahore branch, and finally to
India in November 1961 under the Indo-Pakistan Movable Property Agreement. Upon presentation
of the box, the Appellant refused to take delivery since the appearance and weight of the box was
different from what it had been when it was deposited. A suit was filed seeking delivery of the
ornaments or alternatively recovery of the market value of the ornaments. Referring to the relevant
common law authorities, the Delhi High Court held that the bank would be liable in the capacity of a
bailee for the loss of the ornaments:
“71. The Box was entrusted to the defendant Bank at Peshawar. The same was accepted by the
Bank as a bailee and it was expected that the usual care which is demanded on such matters
would be undertaken…it is established that the defendant Bank failed to discharge its duties as a
bailee and did not take care of the goods of the parents of the plaintiff as one would under
similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk, quantity and value as the goods
bailed.” (emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that in the facts of Jagdish Chandra Trikha (supra), the High Court found
that there was complete entrustment of possession of the appellant’s ornaments. The articles to be
safeguarded were handed over by the customer to the bank in a sealed box, which was then taken to a
safe place to be stored. Though the respondent bank claimed it did not have any knowledge of the
contents of the box, it was proved from evidence that the appellant’s predecessors had handed over a
detailed list of the jewellery which was placed inside the safe deposit box to the bank. It was further
proved that the customer did not have any access to the same after entrustment to the bank. Hence
the High Court considered it a fit case to apply the laws of bailment.
8.1 However, the locker service provided by the banks has evolved since the pre-independence days.
In that era, the bank’s employee was entrusted with the relevant goods for safe keeping. Complete
access to the valuables, if any, remained with the bank till the time the customer claimed return of the
same. However, due to modernization of the locker system, banks now provide customers with
partial access to the lockers. Under the current system, the bank allocates a locker to the customer on
the payment of rent. The customer is then provided with a key to the locker through which he can
gain partial access to the locker. The bank has a master key to the locker and the customer can gain
complete access to the locker only when the bank uses its own key to the locker. Therefore, a
combination of the bank’s key and the locker holder’s key is required for opening a locker, providing
neither with complete access. In more advanced, digitally operated locker systems, such ‘keys’ may
not be physical keys but may consist of passwords or data which is exclusively known to the bank
and the customer. Further, the bank may not have any receipt of the exact particulars of the articles
placed inside the locker, as was the case in Jagdish Chandra Trikha (supra). The question that
therefore arises for consideration before this Court is whether the modern-day bank locker system
would be guided by the laws of bailment.
8.2 An important decision which has considered the modern-day bank locker system is that in
National Bank of Lahore Ltd. vs. Sohan Lal Saigal, AIR 1962 PH 534. In that case, the appellant
bank had provided locker service for the safe custody of valuables. The locker could be operated
jointly by the locker holder and the bank’s custodian. However, the respondent locker holder was able
to prove before the Civil Court that the Manager/custodian of the bank had tampered with the locker
such that it could be operated even without the locker holder’s personal key. Hence the Civil Court
concluded that the Manager had exclusive control over the lockers. Consequently, referring to the
decisions of the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Blair v. Riley, 175 N.E.R 210 and the Supreme Court
of Illinois in National Safe Deposit Company v. Stead, Attorney General, 1495 N.E.R. 973 the
Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the bailor-bailee relationship applied. In this regard, the
High Court observed that:(Pg. 578)
“It may be that the person who hires a locker retains some control over it by having one key
with himself but if the locker can be operated without any key, as was possible in the lockers
which were rented out to the plaintiffs, then at once any impediment in the way of control and
possession of the Bank to whom the locker belonged and in whose strong room it was to be
found, would be removed and it could well be said that the bank was strictly in the position of
the bailee.” (emphasis supplied)
The High Court further observed that the locker holders had produced specific evidence in the form
of lists of the articles of jewellery deposited inside the lockers so as to prove the extent of loss they
had suffered.
8.3 In Mohinder Singh Nanda v. Bank of Maharashtra, 1998 ISJ (Banking) 673 forty-four safe
keeping lockers in the Respondent bank were broken open by miscreants and the contents were
emptied. The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the bank would not be liable for the loss of
articles, if any, since the bank had no knowledge of the contents of the locker:
“4. But there is no evidence on record to show that the defendant-Bank had the knowledge of
the articles in the locker. Unless there is entrustment of the property to the defendant Bank, the
Bank cannot be held responsible for the theft. The plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove that
there was entrustment of the articles with the defendant Bank and that the Bank authorities were
aware of the articles placed in the locker.” (emphasis supplied)
8.4 Subsequently, the Punjab and Haryana High Court again undertook a comprehensive look into
the present-day locker system in Atul Mehra v. Bank of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 P&H 11 which
pertained to the same bundle of facts as in Mohinder Singh Nanda (supra). The appellant locker
holders filed a suit alleging that due to the robbery, jewels worth Rs. 4,26,160/- were stolen from his
locker. It was claimed that the respondent bank had not complied with the duty of care owed under
the laws of bailment. However, the trial court found that the knowledge of the weight and value of
the articles stored inside the locker was exclusive to the customer, and the bank did not have notice
of the same. Further, the appellants had not produced any evidence at the stage of trial to establish the
contents of the locker. Consequently, the Single Judge Bench of Nijjar J. opined that the provisions
with respect to bailment under the Contract Act would not apply as follows:
“17…The respondent bank could only be fastened with liability on the contents of the locker
being disclosed to it. In the absence of this information, it would have to be held that there was
no entrustment of the goods to constitute bailment as required under Section 148 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872.
18…These authorities are of no assistance to the appellants in the present case. In all these cases,
exclusive possession of the property had been handed over by the bailor to the bailee. I am of
the considered opinion that exclusive possession is a sine qua non for bailment. Therefore, I
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that mere hiring of the locker would not be
sufficient to constitute a contract of bailment as provided under Section 148 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. In order to constitute bailment, as provided in Section 148 of the Act, it is
further necessary to show that the actual exclusive possession of the property was given by the
hirer of the locker to the bank. It is only thereafter that the question of reasonable care and
quantum of damages would arise. In the present case, it is impossible to know the quantity,
quality or the value of the jewelry which was allegedly kept in the locker at the time when the
robbery occurred………. In the present case, the plaintiffs alone had the knowledge of contents of
lockers, therefore, the plaintiffs had to lead independent evidence to prove that jewelry was
actually in the locker on the date of the robbery. Even if the plaintiffs had proved this peculiar
fact; they would still have to prove the value of the jewelry.” (emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, the High Court concluded that mere leasing out of the locker ipso facto would not
establish a relationship of bailment between the bank and the locker holder. In order to establish
exclusive possession, the claimant must prove that the bank had knowledge of the contents of the
locker. Alternatively, where the locker holder alone has knowledge of the contents, they must lead
independent evidence to prove that their articles or valuables were actually inside the locker, and the
valuation of the same.
8.5 However, Nijjar J. differentiated the holding in Sohan Lal Saigal (supra) by observing as
follows:
20. “In that case, the learned trial court had held that entrustment and the valuation of jewelry
had been proved…..On the twin grounds of exclusive possession of the jewelry deposited in the
locker and entrustment thereof to the Bank, it has been held that the Bank would be in the
position of bailee.” (emphasis supplied)
Therefore, in Sohan Lal Saigal (supra) entrustment of jewelry was proved on production of
elaborate evidence before the trial court. However, in Mohinder Singh Nanda (supra) and Atul
Mehra (supra) no evidence was led to prove the entrustment of jewelry to the bank, and hence the
claimant locker holders were unable to succeed in obtaining relief. Nijjar J. further observed that:
“22…Whatever property is deposited in the locker is, undoubtedly in the custody and possession
of the bank. Merely because the locker can be operated only in the presence of the locker hirer
would not amount to joint possession of the locker. The Banker can always open the locker with
a “master key”. The hirer of the locker is not in a position to open the locker without the
assistance of the bank. The hirer has access to the locker only during specified banking hours.
The banker has no such limitation. It must, however, be noticed that the transaction of bailment
would only be established if the provisions of Section 148 of the Indian Contract Act are
complied with. With regard to this, it is the submission of Mr. Jagga that the plaintiffs have
miserably failed to prove that the jewellery was kept in the locker as claimed in the plaint.
There being no entrustment or delivery of possession, Section 148 of the Act cannot be invoked
by the plaintiffs.”
Therefore, the Court in Atul Mehra was sympathetic to the fact that the principles of bailment may
be applicable even to the contemporary dual-key locker system if the bank is in the possession of a
master key or has substantial degree of access to the locker. However, the plaintiff would first have to
prove that they had indeed handed over possession of certain articles for being deposited in the
locker of the bank. If this requirement is not satisfied, the Court is barred from going into other issues
such as whether the locker holder and the bank were in joint possession, etc.
8.6 Having perused the aforementioned precedents, we find that what was commonly contested in all
these cases is whether delivery of possession or entrustment of valuables from the locker holder to
the bank had taken place, for the purpose of Section 148 of the Contract Act. Even in the relevant
foreign precedents which we have noted, the application of the principles of bailment was contingent
on determining whether possession was transferred in the facts of the case. This in turn requires
factual findings on whether the bank had knowledge of the contents of the locker; or whether the
locker holder had prepared any receipt or inventory of the articles placed inside the locker or was
otherwise able to prove the particulars of the items deposited in the locker. We are of the considered
opinion that these questions cannot be adjudicated upon in the course of proceedings before the
consumer fora. This aspect must be evaluated by the civil court, upon appreciation of evidence led by
the parties, as was done in all the aforementioned decisions of Jagdish Chandra Trikha (supra),
Sohan Lal Saigal (supra), Mohinder Singh Nanda (supra) and Atul Mehra (supra).
8.7 It is true that the National Commission has, in previous decisions such as Punjab National
Bank, Bombay v. K.B. Shetty, 1991 (1) C.P.C. 592. and Mahender Singh Siwach v. Punjab and
Sind Bank, (2006) 4 CPJ 231 (NC) awarded the value of articles which have been stolen or gone
missing from bank lockers. Moreover, in Pune Zilla Madyawarti Sahakari Bank Limited v.
Ashok Bayaji Ghogare, 2015 SCC OnLine NCDRC 2832 the National Commission has gone to
the extent of holding that the affidavit of the locker holder should ordinarily be accepted for proving
the contents of the bank locker, unless the same stands impeached by way of cross examination.
However, it is relevant to note that in the facts of the aforementioned cases, the complainants had
produced detailed and precise documentary proof for corroborating the extent of jewellery placed
inside the locker, which has not been done in the present case.
8.8 In UCO Bank (supra), similar situation arose as in the present case, wherein the respondent
locker holder claimed that his locker was tampered with and broken open, and valuables were
subsequently lost, due to the negligence of the bank. The bank not only disputed the value of
jewellery kept inside the locker, but also denied any negligence in the breaking open of the locker.
The locker holder had only produced an affidavit in respect of the value of the jewellery claimed by
him. Hence the National Commission held that it is appropriate that both these issues should be
remitted for determination in a civil suit in a competent civil court, after adducing of elaborate
evidence on both sides.
8.9 In the recent case of Mamta Chaudaha v. Branch Manager/Head Manager, State Bank of
India, (2020) 1 CPJ 276 (NC) the National Commission again observed that the appellant locker
holders had not produced any evidence apart from a standard affidavit to prove that they had kept a
specified quantity of gold ornaments inside the bank locker. Further, there was no evidence of
forcible entry to the locker. Hence the complaint for recovery of value of the ornaments was
dismissed.
8.10 In light of the aforementioned conflicting decisions of the National Commission, we find that
the approach adopted by the National Commission in the impugned judgment is the correct approach.
In the present case, the Respondent bank has not disputed their negligence in breaking open the
locker in spite of clearance of rental dues by the Appellant. However, the number of items originally
deposited by the Appellant inside the locker is a contested fact. Hence, we do not propose to record
any conclusions on whether the Appellant locker holder in the present case is entitled to claim return
or recovery of the value of the ornaments alleged to have been deposited by him. We are in
agreement with the findings in the impugned judgment to the extent that the Appellant must file a
separate suit before the competent civil court for seeking this relief and for proving that the aforesaid
items were actually in the custody of the bank. This is especially inasmuch as the contents of the
locker are disputed by the Respondent bank. Hence it is clarified that all questions of fact and law are
left open before the civil court to decide on the merits of the case, including as to whether the law of
bailment is applicable, or any other law as the case may be.
II. Separate Duty of Care of the Bank with regard to Locker Management
9. As discussed supra, imposition of liability upon the bank with respect to the contents of the locker
is dependent upon provision and appreciation of evidence in a civil suit for such purpose. However,
this does not mean that the Appellant in the present case is left without any remedy. Banks as service
providers under the earlier Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as well as the newly enacted Consumer
Protection Act, 2019, owe a separate duty of care to exercise due diligence in maintaining and
operating their locker or safety deposit systems. This includes ensuring the proper functioning of the
locker system, guarding against unauthorized access to the lockers and providing appropriate
safeguards against theft and robbery. This duty of care is to be exercised irrespective of the
application of the laws of bailment or any other legal liability regime to the contents of the locker.
The banks as custodians of public property cannot leave the customers in the lurch merely by
claiming ignorance of the contents of the lockers.
9.1 In this regard, we may refer to the observations made by the National Commission in the
decisions discussed in Part I of our opinion. In Punjab National Bank (supra), in addition to
directing return of the cost of the ornaments lost, the National Commission also made a separate
finding on the negligence of the bank in maintaining the security and safety of the locker:
“4. The last and the most important question is whether the appellant Bank has been guilty of
negligence in ensuring the security and safety of the locker. The State Commission has taken
adverse notice of the fact that the appellant Bank did not probe departmentally when the locker
had been found open on the 9th June, 1988and treated the matter as closed so far as the Bank is
concerned. It was content with lodging a report with the police. It is a matter of common
knowledge, the Master Key of the locker is with the Bank; the locker can be opened only with
the Master Key and the Key with the locker holder. The mechanism is, however, such that the
locker must get closed, if the locker holder takes out his/her key. Further, a certificate is
recorded by the custodian of the Bank that all the lockers operated during a day have been
checked and found properly locked. Such a certificate was also recorded on the 21
stApril, 1988.
The State Commission, therefore, come to the conclusion that the Bank was negligent, in
ensuring the security of the locker with the result that it was found on the 9th June, 1988 to have
been opened unauthorized. For this the State Commission has held that the Bank is squarely
responsible and therefore liable to make good the loss suffered by the respondent complainant.
This Commission fully concurs with the findings of the State Commission.” (emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, the bank was ordered to pay separate costs of Rs 3,500/- by way of compensation to the
locker holder.
9.2 In Mahendar Singh Siwach (supra) the bank negligently allowed a third party, who was the
previous allottee of the locker, to break open the appellant’s locker and take away the valuables
therein. It was found that the bank had failed to duly record and complete the required formalities
with respect to change of allotment from the third party to the current allottee, i.e., the appellant. The
National Commission arraigned the gross deficiency in service committed by the bank as follows:
“…We find that the record itself proves gross negligence and deficiency in service on the part of
the opposite party Bank in rendering service. Firstly, O.P.’s argument is that fraud committed by
Mr. Ramendra Singh Grover, the third party in removing the contents of the locker comes under
criminal jurisdiction, has no relevance as regards enforcement of civil liability against the
opposite party Bank under Consumer Protection Act. There is no other valid argument given on
behalf of the bank except to contend that they did not know the details of the contents of the
locker and hence the Bank cannot be made liable. The Bank officials admitted their mistake and
stated that they are liable to compensate for the same. It is also interesting to see the evidence
produced on record, i.e. an extract from the order of the Learned Sessions Judge, Meerut dated
22.4.1996 granting bail to Mr. Grover which is reproduced hereunder:
“It appears that the alleged crime could not have been committed without the connivance of the
bank authorities. If the locker in question was allotted to the applicant in the year 1978, it is not
clear how it could be allotted to Mahendra Singh Siwach in the year1979. Further, when
Mahendra Singh Siwach has been operating the locker for all these years having his account
No. 284 it is not understandable how the Bank could without verifying from record, accept the
request of the applicant that the locker be broken open as the key had been lost. It was necessary
for the bank authorities to have referred to the bank record and should have also intimated
Mahendra Singh Siwach about this request of the applicant. Not only this, the bank authorities
in the circumstances mentioned above should have prepared an inventory of the articles and
should have got them valued before handing over the same to the applicant. It does not
appear that the police has taken any action against the concerned delinquent bank official. The
applicant-accused claims that he was the owner of the property kept in the locker and the locker
belonged to him. In these circumstances, when no action has been taken against the bank
authorities, I think it proper to release the applicant also on bail.
xxx
It is very strange that the opposite party has not referred to the duties cast on them under their
own instruction manual which is on the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India to support their
case. Similar Manual of Instructions of United Commercial Bank on the guidelines of Reserve
Bank of India filed by the Complainant is reproduced hereunder:
“Maintenance of Record
6.1 Locker Register (Form G -126)
This Register should be maintained lockerwise in serial order so as to facilitate locating the
details of the hirer from the locker number. All the details such as the name(s), their addresses,
operational instructions, rent paid, etc., should be recorded. The name(s) of the hirer(s) should
be indexed in the Register according to alphabetical order.
6.4 Locker Key Register
The branch should also maintain a Locker Key Register. This should be maintained keywise to
lockerwise and lockerwise to keywise so as to facilitate tracing the number of Locker from the
Key number and tracing the number of Key from the Locker number. Moreover, when the locks
of the lockers are interchanged, such changes should be immediately recorded in the Locker
Key Register. It should be marked ‘Strictly Private’ and should be kept in personal custody of
Custodian of locker cabinets. A suggested proforma of Locker Key Register is given in
Annexure 1.
6.5 Daily Register of Access to Hired Lockers (G-125)
Signature of the operator on Locker should be obtained in this Register. Date and time of
operation should also be recorded therein.
6.6 Branch should also maintain a pass book to keep a record of total number of Lockers hired
and number of Lockers surrendered so that it is possible to find out at a particular time the
number of Lockers let out and number of Lockers lying vacant.
At the time of half yearly closing, the stock of keys on hand should be verified in reference to
Lockers lying vacant.
12.3.1 Breaking Open of Locker Due to Loss of
When intimation has been received from hirer(s) about loss of key, the following procedure
should be adopted for breaking open the Locker:-
(a) An application should be obtained from hirer(s) requesting for breaking open the
Locker.
(b) The charges for breaking open the Locker should be realized from the hirer in advance
and kept in Sundry Creditors Account.
(c) An appointment should be made with the agents of the makers of lockers cabinet, to
send their mechanic to drill open the Locker in consultation with the hirer(s). Locker
should be broken open in the presence of the hirer(s), the Manager, Accountant and
Custodian of the locker cabinet, and one respectable witness. A suitable remark about
breaking open of Locker should be made in Locker Register, Renewal Diary and Specimen
Signature Card.
xxx
The procedure laid down by the Reserve Bank of India guidelines has been completely flouted
by the opposite party by not maintaining the locker register, locker key register, non-payment of
rent dues and lastly the procedure that should be adopted for breaking open a locker etc.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.3 In Mamata Chaudaha (supra), though the National Commission dismissed the complaint on the
facts of that case, it noted that the relationship between the bank and the locker holders, who are also
the account holders of the bank, will be that of a service provider and consumer.
10. We may also refer to the circulars which the RBI has issued on this subject from time to time.
The 2007 Circular (supra) has, inter alia, provided the following recommendations for facilitating
easy and safe operation of lockers:
“1.4 Banks are also advised to give a copy of the agreement regarding operation of the locker to
the locker-hirer at the time of allotment of the locker.
2.1 Operations of Safe Deposit Vaults /Lockers
Banks should exercise due care and necessary precaution for the protection of the lockers
provided to the customer. Banks should review the systems in force for operation of safe deposit
vaults / locker at their branches on an on-going basis and take necessary steps. The security
procedures should be well-documented and the concerned staff should be properly trained in the
procedure. The internal auditors should ensure that the procedures are strictly adhered to
2.2 (ii) Where the lockers have not been operated for more than three years for medium risk
category or one year for a higher risk category, banks should immediately contact the locker
hirer and advise him to either operate the locker or surrender it. This exercise should be carried
out even if the locker hirer is paying the rent regularly. Further, the bank should ask the locker
hirer to give in writing, the reasons why he/she did not operate the locker. In case the locker
hirer has some genuine reasons as in the case of NRIs or persons who are out of town due to a
transferable job etc., banks may allow the locker hirer to continue with the locker. Further,
banks should ask the locker hirer to give in writing, the reasons why he/she did not operate the
locker. In case the locker-hirer has some genuine reasons as in the case of NRIs or persons who
are out of town due to a transferable job etc., banks may allow the locker hirer to continue with
the locker. In case the locker-hirer does not respond nor operate the locker, banks should
consider opening the lockers after giving due notice to him..
(iii) Banks should have clear procedure drawn up in consultation with their legal advisers for
breaking open the lockers and taking stock of inventory.” (emphasis supplied)
Hence the RBI had issued clear directions as far back as in 2007 imposing duty of care in respect of
protection of the bank lockers and mandating transparency vis a vis the locker holder in allotment
and breaking open of the lockers. However, it has been left to the discretion of the individual banks
to formulate the exact procedures for fulfilling this duty of care. The banks are likely to draft the
locker hiring agreements in a manner which is favourable to their interests, including clauses to the
effect that the lockers are to be operated at the consumers’ own risk. 10.1. On 1.07.2015, the RBI
issued a Master Circular No. 59/2015-16 on Customer Service in Banks which included updated
guidelines on locker operation. However, these were more or less similar to what has already been
stated in the 2007 Circular. Further, neither of the aforementioned Circulars provide any guidance on
the degree of care that needs to beexercised by the bank for safeguarding the lockers or detail the
exact steps that should be taken in this regard.
11. It appears to us that the present state of regulations on the subject of locker management is
inadequate and muddled. Each bank is following its own set of procedures and there is no uniformity
in the rules. Further, going by their stand before the consumer fora, it seems that the banks are under
the mistaken impression that not having knowledge of the contents of the locker exempts them from
liability for failing to secure the lockers in themselves as well. In as much as we are the highest Court
of the country, we cannot allow the litigation between the bank and locker holders to continue in this
vein. This will lead to a state of anarchy wherein the banks will routinely commit lapses in proper
management of the lockers, leaving it to the hapless customers to bear the costs. Hence, we find it
imperative that this Court lays down certain principles which will ensure that the banks follow due
diligence in operating their locker facilities, until the issuance of comprehensive guidelines in this
regard.
12. Thus, we emphasize that irrespective of the value of the articles placed inside the locker, the bank
is under a separate obligation to ensure that proper procedures are followed while allotting and
operating the lockers:
(a) This includes maintenance of a locker register and locker key register.
(b) The locker register shall be consistently updated in case of any change in allotment.
(c) The bank shall notify the original locker holder prior to any changes in the allotment of the
locker, and give them reasonable opportunity to withdraw the articles deposited by them if they
so wish.
(d) Banks may consider utilizing appropriate technologies, such as blockchain technology
which is meant for creating digital ledger for this purpose.
(e) The custodian of the bank shall additionally maintain a record of access to the lockers,
containing details of all the parties who have accessed the lockers and the date and time on
which they were opened and closed.
(f) The bank employees are also obligated to check whether the lockers are properly closed on a
regular basis. If the same is not done, the locker must be immediately closed and the locker
holder shall be promptly intimated so that they may verify any resulting discrepancy in the
contents of the locker.
(g) The concerned staff shall also check that the keys to the locker are in proper condition.
(h) In case the lockers are being operated through an electronic system, the bank shall take
reasonable steps to ensure that the system is protected against hacking or any breach of security.
(i) The customers’ personal data, including their biometric data, cannot be shared with third
parties without their consent. The relevant rules under the Information Technology Act, 2000
will be applicable in this regard.
(j) The bank has the power to break open the locker only in accordance with the relevant laws
and RBI regulations, if any. Breaking open of the locker in a manner other than that prescribed
under law is an illegal act which amounts to gross deficiency of service on the part of the bank
as a service provider.
(k) Due notice in writing shall be given to the locker holder at a reasonable time prior to the
breaking open of the locker. Moreover, the locker shall be broken open only in the presence of
authorized officials and an independent witness after giving due notice to the locker holder. The
bank must prepare a detailed inventory of any articles found inside the locker, after the locker is
opened, and make a separate entry in the locker register, before returning them to the locker
holder. The locker holder’s signature should be obtained upon the receipt of such inventory so as
to avoid any dispute in the future.
(l) The bank must undertake proper verification procedures to ensure that no unauthorized party
gains access to the locker. In case the locker remains inoperative for a long period of time, and
the locker holder cannot be located, the banks shall transfer the contents of the locker to their
nominees/legal heirs or dispose of the articles in a transparent manner, in accordance with the
directions issued by the RBI in this regard.
(m) The banks shall also take necessary steps to ensure that the space in which the locker
facility is located is adequately guarded at all times,
(n) A copy of the locker hiring agreement, containing the relevant terms and conditions, shall be
given to the customer at the time of allotment of the locker so that they are intimated of their
rights and responsibilities,
(o) The bank cannot contract out of the minimum standard of care with respect to maintaining
the safety of the lockers as outlined supra.
13. In the present case, it is undisputed that the Respondent Bank inadvertently broke the Appellant’s
locker, without any just or reasonable cause, even though he had already cleared his pending dues.
Moreover, the Appellant was not given any notice prior to such tampering with the locker. He
remained in the dark for almost a year before he visited the bank for withdrawing his valuables and
enquired about the status of the locker. Irrespective of the valuation of the ornaments deposited by
the Appellant, he had not committed any fault so far as operation of the locker was concerned. Thus,
the breaking open of the locker was in blatant disregard to the responsibilities that the bank owed to
the customer as a service provider. The alleged loss of goods did not result from any force majeure
conditions, or acts of third parties, but from the gross negligence of the bank itself. It is case of gross
deficiency in service on the part of the bank.
14. Thus, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to impose costs
of Rs. 5,00,000/- on the Bank which should be paid to the Appellant as compensation. The amount of
Rs. 5,00,000/- shall be deducted from the salary of the erring officers, if they are still in service. If
the erring officers have already retired, the amount of costs should be paid by the Bank. Additionally,
the Appellant shall be paid Rs. 1,00,000/- as litigation expense.
15. Before concluding, we would like to make a few observations on the importance of the subject
matter of the present appeal. With the advent of globalization, banking institutions have acquired a
very significant role in the life of the common man. Both domestic and international economic
transactions within the country have increased multiple folds. Given that we are steadily moving
towards a cashless economy, people are hesitant to keep their liquid assets at home as was the case
earlier. Thus, as is evident from the rising demand for such services, lockers have become an
essential service provided by every banking institution. Such services may be availed of by citizens
as well as by foreign nationals. Moreover, due to rapid gains in technology, we are now transitioning
from dual key-operated lockers to electronically operated lockers. In the latter system, though the
customer may have partial access to the locker through passwords or ATM pin, etc., they are unlikely
to possess the technological know-how to control the operation of such lockers. On the other hand,
there is the possibility that miscreants may manipulate the technologies used in these systems to gain
access to the lockers without the customers’ knowledge or consent. Thus the customer is completely
at the mercy of the bank, which is the more resourceful party, for the protection of their assets.
In such a situation, the banks cannot wash off their hands and claim that they bear no liability
towards their customers for the operation of the locker. The very purpose for which the customer
avails of the locker hiring facility is so that they may rest assured that their assets are being properly
taken care of. Such actions of the banks would not only violate the relevant provisions of the
Consumer Protection Act, but also damage investor confidence and harm our reputation as an
emerging economy.
15.1 Thus it is necessary that the RBI lays down comprehensive directions mandating the steps to be
taken by banks with respect to locker facility/safe deposit facility management. The banks should not
have the liberty to impose unilateral and unfair terms on the consumers. In view of the same, we
direct the RBI to issue suitable rules or regulations as aforesaid within six months from the date of
this judgment. Until such Rules are issued, the principles stated in this judgment, in general and at
para 13 in particular, shall remain binding upon the banks which are providing locker or safe deposit
facilities. It is also left open to the RBI to issue suitable rules with respect to the responsibility owed
by banks for any loss or damage to the contents of the lockers, so that the controversy on this issue is
clarified as well.
16. The Appeal is disposed of accordingly.